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John P. Gonzales

Co-Chair, Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of John P. Gonzales

John is a shareholder in the Philadelphia office of Marshall Dennehey and serves as Co-Chair of the Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group. He practices in the areas of civil rights, municipal liability, school claims and employment law.

John has represented police officers and public officials in state and federal court in all aspects of civil rights litigation including claims involving use of force, wrongful arrest and land use. In addition, John has represented public and private employers in wrongful discharge, employment discrimination and defamation claims from administrative proceedings through trial. John has tried dozens of cases in state and federal courts and argued cases before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In addition to his trial work, John has presented numerous seminars to police departments, law firms and government agencies in the areas of police practices, civil rights issues and municipal liability. He has consulted with police departments concerning the development of policies and procedures and provided advice and guidance to employers concerning employment-related matters.

John received his juris doctor from Temple University School of Law, where he was a member of the Moot Court Honor Society, and graduated from the University of Scranton with a Bachelor of Arts in history and philosophy and a Master of Arts in history. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1993)
    • University of Scranton
      • B.A., 1989; M.A. 1989
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2006
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Employment Law – Management (2024-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2020, 2023-2026)
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Workers' Compensation Winter Roundup, Graham Company webinar, December 15, 2020
    • Understanding the Debate with the ADA, FMLA and Workers’ Compensation, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 27, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Local Government Immunity in Pennsylvania, Client Seminar, October 2018
    • Deal or No Deal - Improving Your Negotiating Strategy, Philadelphia Law Department, August 2018
    • Legal Updates for Law Enforcement, Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association's Centennial Training Education Conference, July 14, 2014
    • Managing a Maturing Workforce: The Legal Perspective, Delaware Valley Trust, June 2014
    • Social Media & Cyber Breaches: the Internet's Impact on Your Business, The Graham Company, co-presenter, May 2014
    • Navigating The Bermuda Triangle: The Intersection of Workers' Compensation, FMLA and ADA, Roadmap to Success - Understanding Workers' Compensation, Marshall Dennehey seminar, October 24, 2013
    • Hot Topics in Employment, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Seminar, Philadelphia, PA, October 10, 2013
    • Land Use Litigation and Liability Issues for Local Government, Delaware Founders Insurance Trust, September 2011
    • Land Use Civil Rights and Avoiding Liability video and webinar, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, 2009
    • Police Liability Seminar, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, November 2007
    • Law Enforcement Seminar - Use of Force Issues, Dauphin County, 2006
    • Train the Trainers Program, Municipal Police Officer Education and Training Commission, November 2005
    • Use of Force in Pennsylvania, Lorman Education Services, CLE, February 4, 2005
    • Use of Force in Pennsylvania, Lorman Education Services, CLE, February 6, 2004
    • Tort Claims Act, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, March 2004
    • Civil Rights Liability, Delaware Valley Insurance Trust, March 2004
    • "Pennsylvania's Emergence Code: An Additional Level of Protection for Municipalities and Their Employees Performing Emergency Services," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 2000
    • Co-author, "Sex-Based Shift Assignments: Employers May Use Common Sense," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 7, 1996
    • Co-author, "Employment Discrimination Claims: Arbitration Under Collective Bargaining Clauses," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1996
    • Co-author, "Third Circuit Takes Pennsylvania Beyond 402(A)," Defense Digest, Winter, 1994
    • Defense verdict for local police department in case involving false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of the misidentification of a suspect in a police lineup.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving Title VII Sex Discrimination in the termination of a county court reporter.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving allegations of sexual harassment and hostile work environment at a county prison.
    • Defense verdict for local police department in case involving allegations of false arrest and excessive force arising out of the arrest of a suspect who allegedly assaulted a police officer during a traffic incident.
    • Successful defense of a local police department in the district court and then on appeal to the Third Circuit in case involving allegations of excessive force in the death of a suspect who was alleged to have died while in custody from compression asphyxia.
    • Successful defense of a local municipality in the district court and then on appeal to the Third Circuit in case involving a land use civil rights claim that a developer's substantive due process rights were violated in the context of zoning and land use decisions by a Board of Supervisors.
    • Defense verdict for county employer in case involving claims of first amendment retaliation by a former deputy chief probation officer.
    • Defense verdict for local police officers accused of wrongfully arresting a husband in a domestic dispute.
    • Defense verdict for township detective accused of racial discrimination and conspiracy by an African American police officer in a failure to hire case.

Results

Dismissal of Police Officers Secured Via Sanctions Imposed

We had our clients dismissed via sanctions imposed. On Jan. 6, 2011, Charles Sample was arrested by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Field Unit. The plaintiff alleged the officers seized $40,000 in cash from his vehicle, falsified a search warrant affidavit, disregarded proper procedures and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to drug charges. The plaintiff entered a guilty plea for probation to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, and the charges were nolle prossed. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Jan. 4, 2019, alleging federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. Due to related litigation involving the Narcotics Field Unit, the case was placed in suspense on March 10, 2020, and restored to the active docket on Nov. 15, 2023. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting six causes of action: § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability (against the City of Philadelphia), and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conversion. On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual police officer defendants under FRCP Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with discovery orders, with prejudice. Applying the Poulis factors, the court found the plaintiff personally responsible for nearly two years of non-communication with his counsel, which prejudiced the police officers by delaying trial preparation and demonstrated a history of dilatoriness without reasonable excuse. Lesser sanctions were deemed ineffective due to the plaintiff’s prolonged unresponsiveness, and the merits of his claims could not be evaluated, rendering this factor neutral. The City’s motion to join the police officers’ sanctions motion was denied, as they did not move to compel discovery or demonstrate the plaintiff’s violation of a related court order. 

Summary Judgment Granted in First Amendment Retaliation Claim Case

We were granted summary judgment in the dismissal of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The case was brought against our client, the borough manager, as well as the borough and several other of its employees. The plaintiff worked as a trash man in the Streets Department. With regard to the borough manager, the plaintiff alleged First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a hostile work environment due to racial slurs and discriminatory behavior by coworkers and supervisors. He alleged that he reported these issues to his supervisor and the borough manager, but he felt ignored or silenced. After publicly addressing the alleged racism at a February 2024 Town Council meeting, the plaintiff was terminated a week later following a council vote. The plaintiff filed an EEOC charge and this lawsuit, alleging his termination was retaliatory and discriminatory. We were successful in having the retaliation claims against the borough manager dismissed via summary judgement, but the co-defendants remain active.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.