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Jennifer M. Meyers

Shareholder

JMMeyers@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Jennifer M. Meyers

Jennifer is a Shareholder in the firm's Casualty Department, where she handles all areas of general liability litigation. She has significant experience in a wide range of matters, including personal injury, premises liability, retail liability, and automobile liability. Jennifer has litigated a broad spectrum of cases, including slip and falls, property damage, motor vehicle accidents, dog bites, construction defects, mold exposure, and labor law. As a litigator, Jennifer passionately advocates for her clients in every case she handles and has brought her cases to successful resolution through trial, mediation and motion practice.  

Throughout her career, Jennifer has emphasized the importance of working closely with her clients to develop successful case strategies and effective litigation plans tailored to the unique issues presented by each case she works on. Jennifer also prides herself on her ability to develop good working relationships with her adversaries which ultimately benefit her clients and lead to greater success in the cases she handles.

Before joining the firm in 2015, Jennifer's practice was concentrated in professional liability insurance coverage with a focus on errors and omissions coverage for securities broker/dealers and registered representatives. In this role, Jennifer also assisted in the drafting of insurance policies.

Jennifer graduated from American University in Washington, DC in 2006, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Public Communications and a minor in Business Administration. She received her juris doctor in 2010, graduating cum laude from Pace Law School.  During her time in law school, Jennifer served as president of the American Constitution Society, participated in Moot Court and volunteered with the Unemployment Action Center.

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., cum laude, 2010)
    • American University (B.A., 2006)
    • New York, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2016
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2016
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022)
    • Hudson Valley Magazine, Top Lawyer (2022)
    • Westchester Women's Bar Association, January 2015
    • Pre-suit Litigation: How to Effectively Investigate Your Claim, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 25th, 2023
    • Best Billing Practices, CLE Client Seminar, May 2, 2014
    • "When is it Too Late to Change Your Theory of the Case?" New York Law Journal, Litigation Special Report, March 13, 2023
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing third-party plaintiff's claims for contribution and indemnification on behalf of a snow removal contractor, in a case where parties failed to demonstrate any breach of duty owed by the snow removal contractor.
    • Won two appeals before the Appellate Division, Second Department. We represented an out-of-possession landlord in a personal injury action which became the subject to two appeals before the Appellate Division, Second Department. The plaintiff worked in retail and was allegedly injured due to a claimed defect to the front door. After we moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff opposed our motion and made an entirely new allegation of liability against our client. She also sought leave to amend her bill of particulars to assert this new claim. The plaintiff's motion to amend was granted, and our motion for summary judgment was denied with leave to renew after additional discovery relating to the plaintiff's new claim. We appealed this decision. The Appellate Court unanimously reversed the decision granting the plaintiff's motion to amend and reversed its order denying summary judgment, finding that our insured was an out-of-possession landlord. With respect to the second appeal, after the plaintiff was given leave to amend her bill of particulars, we conducted further discovery and moved for summary judgment a second time, and we won this motion. The court agreed with our position that our client was an out-of-possession landlord, and the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate notice. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The Appellate Court unanimously dismissed her appeal. 
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case on the grounds that plaintiff did not put forth sufficient evidence establishing her claim that she sustained a "Serious Injury" pursuant to New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d).
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a property damage trial, where the plaintiff was claiming ongoing flooding and damage to her condominium.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case in a personal injury action where the plaintiff was a passenger on a school bus involved in an accident. Jennifer demonstrated that plaintiff did not put forth sufficient evidence establishing her claim that she sustained a "Serious Injury" pursuant to New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d).
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's case in a slip and fall action, where the plaintiff failed to establish creation or notice, and therefore, could not prove any negligence on the part of the condominium.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against an out of possession landlord following a workplace injury.
    • Obtained summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint in a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff claimed she fell on a defective sidewalk in Yonkers, New York.

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Case Law Alerts

Federal Court Dismisses Portions of Plaintiff’s Claims Against Insurer for Failing to Pay UIM Benefits

October 1, 2023

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and claims to have sustained serious personal injuries. The plaintiff had $600,000 in underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage with his insurer. The plaintiff settled his primary underinsured claim and the third-party bodily injury claim with the tortfeasor for the total policy limits and for the majority of the primary uninsured limits.  The plaintiff claimed that his insurer delayed in paying the UIM benefits. In its defense of USAA, Marshall Dennehey moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, and we successfully knocked out a number of the plaintiff’s claims, including the claim for bad faith. Interestingly, the court determined that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient grounds as a matter of law to establish bad faith—noting that “negligence or bad judgment does not equate to bad faith.”  This determination appears to narrow the application of the second prong establishing bad faith, which requires that the insurer “knew or recklessly disregarded the lack of reasonable basis.”      Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

Federal District Court Finds that Mental Health Records Are Not Discoverable Under Ohio State Law

October 1, 2023

While the plaintiff claimed that, following his motor vehicle accident with the defendants’ semi-trailer truck, he suffered from “head pain, neck pain, headaches, sensitivity to light, sensitivity to sound, trouble concentrating, memory loss…and mental anguish,” the defendants were denied the right to obtain the plaintiff’s mental health records as they were deemed unrelated to the subject claim.      Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.