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Haleigh A. Catalano

Associate

HACatalano@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Haleigh A. Catalano

Haleigh is an associate in the Casualty Department, where she focuses her practice on the defense of clients in a wide range of civil litigation matters, including premises liability, motor vehicle accidents, and general liability claims. 

Before joining the firm in September 2025, Haleigh served as a judicial law clerk in the Civil Division of the Essex County Superior Court for the Hon. Aldo J. Russo, J.S.C. During her clerkship, she conducted in-depth legal research and writing on a variety of civil matters, assisted in managing a high-volume docket, prepared bench memoranda, and draft opinions. In this role, she gained valuable experience in all phases of litigation, including motion practice, discovery disputes, settlement conferences, and trial preparation.

Haleigh earned her juris doctor, cum laude, from the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University in 2024. While in law school, she served as the Promotions Editor for the Pace Environmental Law Review, where she oversaw the publication’s outreach and contributed to the editorial process. She also served as Vice President of the Lambda Law Students Association, working to promote diversity and representation within the legal community. 

Outside of work, Haleigh enjoys traveling, reading, staying active through fitness, film photography, and exploring local restaurants.
 

    • The Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • American University (B.A., 2017)
    • New Jersey, 2025
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2025
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Puerto Rican Bar Association
    • The LGBT Bar Association of New York

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

When Immunity Ends: What Galette v. NJ Transit Means for Liability Exposure

June 30, 2026

Key Points: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that New Jersey Transit Corporation is not an arm of the state and cannot claim interstate sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs can now sue NJ Transit in the state where an accident occurs, expanding litigation venues. Forum selection risk increases, including plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. Expect higher defense costs and broader exposure in multi-state incidents. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, 607 U.S.(2026), marks a significant shift in how liability exposure is assessed for public transportation entities operating across state lines. In a unanimous ruling issued just last month, the Court held that NJ Transit does not qualify as an “arm of the state” for purposes of sovereign immunity. As a result, it can be sued in courts outside New Jersey. This ruling has substantial consequences, particularly for insurers, risk managers, and defense counsel handling casualty and liability claims. Sovereign immunity is a tool used to protect states and certain state entities from being sued without consent, especially in federal or out-of-state courts. Historically, organizations tied to state governments have used this doctrine to limit where they can be sued. Galette arose from separate accidents involving NJ Transit buses outside New Jersey state lines. One of the central cases involved Cedric Galette, who was injured in 2018, in Philadelphia, when a vehicle he occupied was struck by an NJ Transit bus. He filed suit in Pennsylvania. NJ Transit argued that, as an arm of the State of New Jersey, it could not be sued in another state’s courts. Lower courts rejected that position, and the issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. Writing for the majority, Justice Sonia Sotomayor emphasized that sovereign immunity protects the state itself, not every entity it creates. The key question the Court addressed in its opinion was whether the state structured the entity as legally separate from the state itself. In this case, the answer was yes. In simpler terms, the Court found that NJ Transit should not be treated the same as the State of New Jersey when it comes to lawsuits. This decision has broader implications for how liability risk is evaluated across a range of public and quasi-public entities. Several factors informed the Court’s decision. First, the Court found that NJ Transit is a separate corporate entity with the power to sue and be sued, enter contracts, and hold property. Second, the Court found that it is financially independent: its debts and liabilities are not obligations of the State of New Jersey. Third, although the state exercises oversight, the Court found that this oversight did not override NJ Transit’s legal separateness. Taken together, the Court reasoned, these characteristics placed NJ Transit squarely outside the scope of sovereign immunity. This decision carries immediate implications for casualty and insurance professionals. Most importantly, it expands litigation exposure; plaintiffs are no longer limited to suing NJ Transit in New Jersey. Instead, they may bring claims in the state where an accident occurs. This increases the likelihood of cases being filed in jurisdictions with more favorable laws, higher jury awards, or procedural advantages for plaintiffs, and creates uncertainty in claims handling. Insurers will now be required to account for variability in legal standards, jury behavior, and damages depending on where a case is filed. What might have been a predictable exposure in one jurisdiction can become far less certain in another. The decision in Galette will also lead to an increased risk of forum shopping. Plaintiffs may strategically choose venues they believe will offer better outcomes, particularly in high-value bodily injury cases, complicating defense strategy and affecting every aspect of a case from early evaluation to settlement posture. The Court’s reasoning is not limited to NJ Transit: it signals that other quasi-public entities, like regional transportation authorities or public utilities, may face similar challenges if they attempt to use sovereign immunity as a shield to lawsuits. Courts will look closely at how an entity is structured, including its financial independence and legal status, rather than relying on labels or general affiliations with a state. For insurers, this decision raises important underwriting and risk assessment questions. Entities previously viewed as benefiting from immunity protections may now present broader and more complex exposure. Policy terms, limits, and pricing may need to be revisited to respond to an increased risk landscape. The Galette opinion also holds cost implications for insurers and defense counsel. Defending cases in a variety of jurisdictions typically increases costs, as the need for local counsel and varied procedural rules are factors that now must be considered. In jurisdictions known for higher verdicts, indemnity exposure may rise as well. These factors are particularly relevant in matters involving bodily injury, mass transit incidents, and multi-party accidents. In response to Galette, insurers and defense teams should place greater emphasis on early case strategy. Determining where a case may be filed and whether venue can be challenged will be critical issues to tackle early on. Coverage for public or quasi-public entities should take into consideration the possibility of multi-state exposure, increased defense obligations, and the potential for higher verdicts depending on the jurisdiction. The broader significance of Galette lies in its message: courts are willing to scrutinize claims of sovereign immunity and will not extend protections automatically. Entities that operate with a degree of independence, even if those entities are publicly created, may be treated more like private actors for liability purposes. For insurance professionals, the takeaway is straightforward: assumptions about immunity-based defenses should be revisited. Organizations that were once considered relatively insulated by sovereign immunity can now face expanded exposure, more complex litigation, and higher costs. In an environment where jurisdiction can significantly influence outcomes, Galette underscores the importance of anticipating not just whether a claim will be filed, but where it will be litigated. Haleigh works in our Roseland, NJ office. He can be reached at (973) 618-4153 or HACatalano@MDWCG.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.