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Gabriella M. Wittbrod

Portrait of Gabriella M. Wittbrod

As an associate attorney in the Health Care Department, Gabriella defends healthcare entities in civil litigation matters including medical malpractice and long-term care liability. Given her strong background in healthcare, Gabriella utilizes her knowledge and skill to effectively represent medical professionals and providers, hospitals, and extended care facilities.

Gabriella received her B.S. in Microbiology from The Ohio State University and her J.D. from Case Western Reserve University. She is admitted to practice in the State of Ohio and the Northern and Southern Federal Districts of Ohio.

    • Case Western Reserve University School of Law (J.D., 2023)
    • The Ohio State University (B.S., 2020)
    • Ohio, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 2023
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • "State Constitutional Law: The Future of Abortion Rights?" Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine, Vol. 33, 2023

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Ohio

February 25, 2026

Ohio Appellate Courts Split on Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Damages Cap: Sixth District Enforces Limit McNalley v. Keiser, 2025-Ohio 5561 Earlier this year, the 10th District and the 8th District in Lyon v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, 2025-Ohio-2991 (10th Dist.) and Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-275 (8th Dist.), respectively, held that Ohio’s medical malpractice non-economic damages cap is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff-appellees. Ohio’s 6th District in its case, McNalley v. Keiser, 2025-Ohio-5561 (6th Dist.), held that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing that the non-economic damages cap was unconstitutional as applied. McNalley sued radiologist Dr. Keiser and his employer after Keiser allegedly failed to diagnose a blood clot, resulting in extensive bowel loss and short-gut syndrome. At trial, a jury awarded McNalley approximately $5.15 million, including $4.5 million in non-economic damages. Dr. Keiser moved to apply the statutory cap on non-economic damages for medical claims, which limits recovery to $500,000 for plaintiffs who suffer catastrophic injuries. McNalley opposed the motion, arguing that the statute violated both due process and equal protection as applied to him, although the 6th District noted that the substance of McNalley’s arguments suggested he was arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The trial court denied the motion, holding the cap unconstitutional as applied to McNalley, but declined to find the statute unconstitutional on its face. On appeal, the 6th District emphasized the critical distinction between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. In a rational basis analysis, as used here, to show that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the movant must show beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute may be valid. To show a statute as unconstitutional as applied, a movant must show clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing set of facts that makes the statute unconstitutional when those facts are applied. Although McNalley framed his argument as an as-applied due process challenge, the court found that he failed to present clear and convincing, case-specific facts showing that the statute was unreasonable or arbitrary as applied to him. Instead, his arguments—like those relied upon by the trial court—amounted to a broader attack on the statute’s treatment of all catastrophically injured medical malpractice plaintiffs, which constitutes a facial challenge, and he did not meet the heightened standard. The court was not persuaded by the holding in Paganini, going so far as to indicate that they would have agreed with the defendants that the challenge in Paganini was actually a facial challenge and would have held differently. Accordingly, the court held that the holding in Lyon was appropriately found, based upon articulated and specific facts as applied to the plaintiff. In this case, the court noted that both parties’ arguments were nearly devoid of facts, thereby only allowing it to view the challenge as a facial challenge. Because McNalley did not meet the heightened burden required for a facial challenge and the record lacked specific factual findings supporting an as-applied challenge, the 6th District concluded that the statutory cap must be enforced. The 6th District reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to apply the noneconomic damages cap under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), reinstating the statutory limitation on McNalley’s recovery. The Ohio Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Paganini on February 10, 2026. The decision in Lyon has not been appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Ohio

November 1, 2025

Another Ohio District Court Rules that the Non-Economic Damages Cap on Catastrophic Medical Injuries Is Unconstitutional as Applied Lyon v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, (10th Dist.), 2025-Ohio-2991 Following the 8th District Court of Appeals’ ruling in Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland earlier this year, the 10th District has likewise ruled that the non-economic damages cap under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3) is unconstitutional as applied. Susana Lyon filed a medical negligence complaint against Riverside Methodist Hospital, among other defendants, for failure to diagnose a thiamine deficiency, which she alleged resulted in her developing Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome and a severe neurological injury. On April 20, 2023, a Franklin County jury awarded Lyon damages of $25,172,525.32. The breakdown of damages is as follows: Economic Damages: Past Medical Care/Expenses: $744,157.32 Future Medical Expenses: $4,428,369.00 Non-Economic Damages: Past Non-Economic Damages: $5,000,000.00 Future Non-Economic Damages: $15,000,000.00 After the trial verdict, the defendants filed a motion to enforce the non-economic damages cap of $500,000 under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), which Lyons challenged, both facially and as applied, under due process and equal protection grounds. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion and held that the damages cap is unconstitutional.  In assessing whether the trial court erred in declaring that the medical claim damages cap is unconstitutional, the 10th District considered the constitutionality of the statute both facially and as applied under both due process and equal protection grounds. Under the rational basis test, the 10th District held that the statute bears a real and substantial relation to the public interest concerns. Thus, the analysis of the statute hinges on whether the cap is unreasonable or arbitrary. Importantly, the 10th District held that under both due process and equal protection grounds, the damages cap is not facially unreasonable or arbitrary. Yet, persuaded by the 8th District’s ruling in Paganini, the 10th District held that, as applied to Lyon, the non-economic damages cap is clearly and convincingly unreasonable and arbitrary. If the cap were to be applied, Lyon’s award would be reduced by 57.4%, which the 10th District reasoned is unreasonable and arbitrary. The court also found it troubling that the statute does not adjust for inflation and calculated that the $500,000 cap that was enacted by the Ohio Legislature in 2003 would equate to only $286,475.79 as of April 2025. Thus, under due process grounds, the 10th District found that the cap is unconstitutional as applied to Lyon. Under equal protection grounds, the 10th District similarly held that, as applied to Lyon, the non-economic damages cap is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that, under Ohio law, there is no cap for non-economic damages for catastrophic injuries that are non-medical, but there is a cap for medical claims. The 10th District held:  [lit is unreasonable and arbitrary that Lyon should be treated differently in this instance than an individual that suffered catastrophic injuries in a nonmedical malpractice context. If Lyon was injured by the appellants in an automobile injury, instead of in the medical negligence setting, she would have been entitled to the full award of noneconomic damages. As of May 27, 2025, Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland is pending in the Ohio Supreme Court (2025-0386). Riverside Methodist Hospital has not yet appealed the 10th District’s ruling.   The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.  

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.