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Elizabeth B. Ferguson

Portrait of Elizabeth B. Ferguson

Elizabeth is a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department. Her practice focuses on the defense of owners, contractors, material suppliers, developers, and design professionals (architects, engineers and surveyors) against claims of liability, breach of contract, construction defect, design defect, delay, liens/bonds, insurance coverage issues, and licensure issues. She also provides transactional support for her construction clients, including contract drafting and review. Elizabeth has been Board Certified in Construction Law by The Florida Bar since 2009 and is AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell. She served on the Florida Board of Professional Engineers, appointed by Gov. Rick Scott, from 2015-2018.

Elizabeth is a Construction Panel Arbitrator for the American Arbitration Association, has served as a professor of construction law, and is a frequent speaker on legal and construction industry issues. In 2019, she was selected as an "Ultimate Attorney" in the area of construction law by the Jacksonville Business Journal. As a Florida Board Certified expert in construction law, her typical matters include residential, commercial and roadway construction matters, from pre-suit through trial and arbitration. She also defends clients before professional licensing boards related to disciplinary and licensure issues.

    • Indiana University Maurer School of Law (J.D., 2002)
    • College of Wooster (B.A., 1999)
    • Florida, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2005
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Construction (2022-2026)
    • Florida Super Lawyers (2018-2026)
    • Florida Trend, Legal Elite, 2023 Notable Women Leaders in Law
    • Florida Super Lawyers Rising Star-Construction Litigation (2009-2017)
    • Florida Trend Magazine, Legal Elite, Construction Law (2014, 2018, 2020, 2021)
    • Florida Trend Magazine, Up and Comer (2008, 2010-2013)
    • Ultimate Attorney, Jacksonville Business Journal, Construction Law (2019)
    • American Bar Association, Forum on the Construction Industry, 2009 – 2019
    • Associated Builders and Contractors
    • Chester Bedell Inn of Court
    • Florida Association of Women Lawyers
    • The Florida Bar, Board Certified in Construction Law, 2009- Present
    • The Florida Bar, Construction Law Committee, Co-Vice Chair; 2021-2022
    • The Florida Bar, Construction Law Committee, Pro Bono Chair, 2022 - 2023
    • The Florida Bar, Construction Law Review Course Steering Committee, Co-Chair, 2020-2023
    • The Florida Bar Construction Law Certification Committee, 2023-2024
    • The Florida Bar, Grievance Committee 4A, Vice-Chair, 2017-2020
    • The Florida Bar Judicial Nominating Procedures Committee, 2021-2024
    • The Florida Bar, RPPTL Section, Executive Committee Member, 2018-Present
    • Florida Board of Professional Engineers, Former Board Member
    • Jacksonville Bar Association, President: 2019-2020; Board of Governors: 2012-2020; Construction Law Section: 2011-Present
    • Phi Delta Phi, Wilkie Inn
    • "Big Impact on Duty to Defend Florida Construction Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2018
    • Case Law Alerts, contributor, April 2018-present
    • Legal Updates for Construction Litigation, June 2017-present
    • Design Professional Liability, The Florida Bar Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section's Advanced Construction Law & Certification Review Course, Orlando, Florida, March 5-7, 2026
    • Florida Construction Law, Construction Licensing Officials Association of Florida Conference, May 29, 2025
    • Florida Construction Defect Litigation, Jacksonville Bar Association's Florida Construction Defect Litigation CLE Lunch & Learn, April 30, 2024
    • Design Liability, The Florida Bar Construction Law Institute, Orlando, Florida, March 23, 2024
    • Views from the Bench: Complex Construction Litigation – Trials and the Run-Up, The Florida Bar Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section’s Construction Law Institute, Orlando, Florida, March 22, 2024
    • How Insurers Are Controlling Expert Costs in Construction Defect Claims, AM Best Webinar, November 7, 2023
    • The Impact of Altman on Defense and Indemnity Obligations in Florida, CLM Webinar, September 2018
    • Defense of construction, engineering and inspection sub-consultant on an FDOT project with a value over $111 million, involving claims brought by contractor for professional negligence and breach of duty.
    • Defense of large southeast residential developer and home builder against claims by individual owners for construction defect, including improperly installed stucco, windows and roofing systems. Represented same builder in over 100 suits against the original subcontractors to recover costs incurred by the builder for remediation and repair of the homes.
    • Defense of construction, engineering and inspection contractor from claims of insufficient maintenance of traffic in a roadway construction zone, case involved the death of two eighteen year olds.
    • Defense of subcontractor against multi-million dollar construction defect and unfair trade practices claims by general contractor and owner. Case involved construction of multiple buildings, water intrusion and mold claims.
    • Defense of nation-wide residential developer and home builder in a multi-million dollar construction defects and mold claim brought by individual owners seeking class certification of over 350 homes.
    • Welcome v. Arvida, 903 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
    • Board Certified Specialist, Construction Law, The Florida Bar

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Construction Litigation

Proposed Changes to Florida’s Statutes of Limitations and Repose Would Greatly Impact Construction Defect Litigation

January 11, 2022

A new bill has been proposed in the Florida Legislature that would amend the statutes of limitations and repose greatly impacting construction defect litigation.  The original bill proposed to rewrite Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(c) by completely eliminating the ten-year statute of repose for latent defects, instead requiring all actions founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property to be filed within four years. The proposed four-year time period would begin from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.  After introduction of the bill, the Committee on Community Affairs proposed a complete overhaul of 95.11, as it relates to construction defect litigation. The Committee proposes a new subsection be added to Fla. Stat. 95.11, subsection 12, titled “ACTIONS RELATING TO AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY.” This new section lays out 4 categories of improvements: Category 1 improvements cover detached single-family home, including pre-manufactured homes, or standalone building structures intended for use by a single business, occupant or owner, not exceeding three stories in height and related improvements to such homes, buildings or structures.  Category 2 improvements include single-family dwelling units not exceeding three stories in height which are constructed in a series or group of attached units or a commercial or nonresidential building not exceeding three stories in height and related improvements to such dwellings, buildings or structures.  Category 3 improvements include commercial or residential buildings or structures of four or more stories in height and related improvements to such buildings or structures.  Category 4 improvements is a catchall for any improvement that does not fall under Categories 1-3.   Further, the proposal amends the statute of limitations to read: “An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property may be commenced within 4 years after the time to commence an action begins to run.” The repose period would be shortened to five years after the time for commencing an action begins to run for category 1 improvements; seven years for category 2 improvements; 12 years for category 3 improvements, and 10 years for category 4 improvements. The time to commence such an action would begin to run from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is earliest.  The proposed amendment contains a limited one-year extension of time for counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims that arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in a pleading that the current statute contains. It also maintains that warranty work or correction or repair of defects to completed does not extend the period of time within which an action must be commenced.   If signed into law, these amendments would apply to any action commenced on or after July 1, 2022, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. However, any action that would not have been time barred before the amendments may be commenced before July 1, 2023. Any action not commenced by July 1, 2023, that is barred by the amendments is barred.   Legal Update for Construction Litigation – January 11, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Case Law Alerts

Florida’s Fourth Circuit continues trend requiring apportionment of damages in construction cases.

January 11, 2021

The Court of Appeals rejected the arguments of the plaintiff and held the apportionment of damages by the underlying court utilizing comparative fault was proper. As a result, the allocation of damages by the underlying court per § 768.81, Florida Statutes, was also proper. However, the Court of Appeals did reverse on the amount of damages. The court specifically affirmed that Part II of Chapter 768, Florida Statutes, applies to any action for damages, whether couched in tort or contract. Further, the court noted that, although § 768.81(3), Florida Statutes, requires apportionment of damages in “negligence” actions, negligence is defined in the statute as: . . . without limitation, a civil action for damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories. The substance of an action, not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action. § 768.81(1), Florida Statutes (emphasis added). This new ruling out of the Fourth Circuit continues the trend in Florida requiring apportionment of damages in construction cases, throwing aside the previous use of joint and several liability.   Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.