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Elias focuses his practice exclusively on workers' compensation litigation. He represents employers and insurance carriers, defending them against all manner of workers’ compensation claims. Elias is experienced in all aspects of claims handling, from initial investigation and testimony of fact and medical expert witnesses, to brief writing and litigating before the courts.

Elias has secured positive results for his clients and received favorable decisions from Workers’ Compensation Judges, the Appellate Board and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. He is also experienced in handling Heart and Lung Act arbitrations. By placing a high priority on communication, Elias partners with his clients to develop tailored risk management and defense strategies that best meet their needs.

Elias received a B.A. in English & Political Science from Bucknell University and his J.D. from Widener University. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2006)
    • Bucknell University (B.A., 2003)
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section Assistant Secretary
    • Proper Identification of Pain Generators in Work Injuries/Personal Injuries and Novel Treatment Options, Philadelphia Bar Association’s 2023 Bench-Bar & Annual Conference, September 23, 2023, Atlantic City, NJ

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The $30,000 Oops! An Insurer’s Costly Overpayment

December 1, 2025

Key Points:  Commonwealth Court held that pharmacy was not a party in the underlying UR litigation and could not be made a party to the insurer’s review billing petition since there is no equitable remedy in the Workers’ Compensation Act that would allow recoupment of overpaid medical bills by the insurer.  Accordingly, insurer had to forfeit $30,000 overpayment. Unlike most Commonwealth Court cases addressing workers’ compensation issues, Pioneer Construction Co., Inc., Eastern Alliance Insurance Company, and Employers Alliance, Inc. v. Insight Pharmaceuticals, LLC (d/b/a Insight Pharmacy), 338 A.3d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025), was an appeal of a Court of Common Pleas decision, not a Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board opinion.  The insurer, Eastern Alliance Insurance Company, mistakenly overpaid Insight Pharmacy over $30,000. In a 2020 decision, a workers’ compensation judge granted a petition to review medical treatment or billing and ordered the pharmacy to reimburse the insurer the overpaid amount. However, the Commonwealth Court ultimately ruled that the insurer could not be reimbursed and had to forfeit the money. This case started with a March 2015 Utilization Review (UR), which found that, as of December 2014, certain compound creams were no longer reasonable or necessary treatment for the claimant’s work injury. The UR was not challenged by the claimant; therefore, the insurer was no longer responsible for payment of the compound creams. However, in October 2018, the pharmacy submitted bills for the unreasonable and unnecessary compound creams to the insurer, which processed those bills. The insurer mistakenly paid the pharmacy $30,767.14. (Yikes!) Upon realizing its $30,000 error, the insurer asked the pharmacy to refund the payments. The pharmacy declined. The insurer then filed a workers’ compensation petition to review medical treatment or billing and a petition to join the pharmacy to the proceedings.  In response to the petitions, the pharmacy argued that the workers’ compensation judge lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement because the pharmacy could not be a party to the judge’s proceedings and the Workers’ Compensation Act contains no reimbursement remedy for insurers who overpay providers. The pharmacy argued that equity was not available to the insurer and the underlying judge’s proceedings violated its right to due process because it could not be a party to that proceeding. In an October 2020 decision, the workers’ compensation judge found that the insurer had overpaid the pharmacy, granted the billing review and joinder petitions, and ordered the pharmacy to reimburse the insurer the $30,000 overpayment. The pharmacy did not appeal this decision.  In January 2021, the insurer filed a praecipe in Common Pleas Court, requesting that the $30,000 judgment ($30,767.14 plus $475.41 in statutory interest) be entered against the pharmacy.  In a February 2021 letter to the insurer, the pharmacy demanded that the insurer withdraw the praecipe or the pharmacy would seek sanctions against the insurer on the bases that: the insurer falsely identified the pharmacy as a party to the judge’s proceedings, the pharmacy could not appeal the judge’s decision because it was not a party to the workers’ compensation litigation, and  the insurer did not properly serve the praecipe on the pharmacy.  The insurer responded by arguing that, because the pharmacy participated in the judge’s proceedings and did not take an appeal from the judge’s October 2020 decision and order, the pharmacy was bound by that decision. In April 2021, the pharmacy filed a motion to open the default judgment and a motion for sanctions in the Court of Common Pleas and a brief in support. The insurer filed a response opposing the petitions and a supporting brief.  Only weeks later, in May 2021, by order and without a hearing, the Court of Common Pleas denied the pharmacy’s petitions. On May 27, 2021, the pharmacy appealed from the Common Pleas Court’s order to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. In its opinion, the Commonwealth Court reviewed a discussion of the pharmacy’s arguments and its holdings, which ultimately were unfavorable to the insurer. The pharmacy first argued that the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction because the pharmacy “was never properly served with the judgment.” The Commonwealth Court did not accept that argument—that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the judgment was not properly served—and held that it lacked merit. Second, the pharmacy argued that the insurer filed the praecipe in the Court of Common Pleas despite the fact that the pharmacy was not a party to the prior UR and judge’s proceedings that gave rise to the judgment; thus, the trial court violated its due process rights and erred by entering judgment against it. The Commonwealth Court held that, because the Workers’ Compensation Act provides no reimbursement remedy for insurers that overpay providers, the pharmacy’s counsel participated before the judge solely to assert that there was no basis under the Act for the judge to join the pharmacy or order it to reimburse the insurer. The Commonwealth Court held the judge had no valid equitable basis to join the pharmacy to the insurer’s billing review petition; therefore, the pharmacy was not, and could not, be a party to the UR and the judge’s proceedings. The Commonwealth Court held that, because the pharmacy was not a party to the UR and judge’s proceedings, the trial court erred as a matter of law by not striking the judgment against the pharmacy.  Third, the pharmacy argued that the trial court erred by denying the pharmacy’s petition to open the default judgment where Section 428 of the Act authorizes only employees or dependents deprived of compensation to recover from an employer or insurer in default of payment. The Commonwealth Court held that, without precedential supporting legal authority, the trial court disregarded the plain language of Section 428 of the Act to allow the insurer to become an entity requesting judgment against an entity not statutorily liable (an employee or dependent). The Commonwealth Court held that the pharmacy was not statutorily able to be liable for a default judgment and the Court of Common Pleas erred by not striking the judgment against the pharmacy on that basis. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Court held that the pharmacy was not a party in the underlying UR litigation and, therefore, cannot be made a party to the insurer’s review billing petition since there is no equitable remedy in the Act that would allow recoupment of overpaid medical bills by the insurer. Accordingly, the insurer was out of luck and had to forfeit the $30,000 overpayment.  Going forward, insurers and employers should pay attention to Utilization Review determinations to avoid similar situations. After obtaining a favorable UR determination that finds treatment to be unreasonable and unnecessary, follow-up with the insurer’s billing or payment departments so they, too, know that further provider payments should not be made. Unfortunately, if they are paid mistakenly, they cannot be recouped.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Pa. High Court Doubles Down on the Workers’ Comp Act’s Exclusivity Provision

August 3, 2023

Employers continue to be shielded from defending against lawsuits by employees when the matter at issue is intertwined with the workers’ compensation claim and an employee alleges a failure to investigate a workplace injury.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.