.

Edward J. Tuite

Ed joined Marshall Dennehey in 2000. He concentrates his practice in special investigation unit/fraud investigation and defense, automobile, construction law, premises liability, and commercial trucking litigation. Over the course of his career, Ed has handled thousands of auto liability cases, hundreds of construction cases, and several hundred fraud cases involving auto and premises liability. He has represented numerous trucking companies and commercial carriers, as well as insurance carriers in project defense work regarding fraudulent and questionable billing practices, claims for personal injury protection, and medical benefit matters.

Ed is a 1978 graduate of St. Joseph's University and Villanova University School of Law, where he received his juris doctor in 1981. After law school, he entered private practice at Goushian, Mooradian & Goldsmith, where he handled a diverse range of civil litigation, from automobile liability to complex product liability matters.

For 14 years, Ed was the managing attorney of AIG Insurance Company's staff counsel for Philadelphia and surrounding counties, where he oversaw a legal staff of 45 and his offices handled general defense litigation, including automobile liability, product liability, professional liability and dram shop litigation. 

Ed has lectured for various insurance claims departments on topics such as automobile litigation, construction litigation, SIU, and professional liability. He serves as a judge pro tempore for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, as well as an arbitrator for Montgomery County, Philadelphia County and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Outside of his practice, Ed is active in multiple coaching positions in local basketball and soccer organizations. 

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1981)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.S., 1978)
    • Pennsylvania, 1981
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Chester County Bar Association
    • Delaware County Bar Association
    • Montgomery County Arbitrator
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Philadelphia County Arbitrator
    • Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Pro Tem
    • Temple Inn of Court
    • United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Arbitrator
    • Obtaining a defense verdict at trial in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in a multi-party wrongful death trucking case, where the co­defendant was found solely liable and $3 million damages were awarded.
    • Obtaining a non-suit prior to submission to a jury for a construction defendant joined to a multi-party construction case involving close-head trauma, where the jury ultimately awarded $2,750,000 in damages against the remaining co-defendants.
    • Obtaining a defense verdict for a large trucking concern against claims of product spoliation and product liability, where the co-defendant was found liable for the plaintiff's damages in the amount of $16 million.
    • Successfully defending at trial and at binding arbitration multiple high-exposure fraud cases in which either a defense verdict was obtained and/or claims were voluntary dismissal by the claimants. Ed has argued before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and has set the legal precedent in Pennsylvania that an employer cannot be sued in dual capacity circumstances, such as simultaneous product liability and employer liability. His courtroom experience includes approximately 175 trials or binding arbitrations and 75 jury trials, nearly half of which resulted in defense verdicts, and an equal number in which verdicts or settlements were obtained significantly below the settlement demand.
    • Update on Medical Fraud / Bad Economy and The Plot Thickens, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud Perspectives Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June 2012
    • Medical Provider Fraud and the 3rd Party Case, Combating Insurance Fraud Seminar, Conshohocken, PA, 2010
    • Emerging Trends in Fraud Litigation, Annual seminar to Chubb Insurance 
    • Auto Law Developments, First Acceptance Insurance Company 
    • Defending the Wrongful Death Case and Damages; Defending High Exposure Cases; and Construction Law Seminar to PAM Claims, on behalf of the PHI 
    • "Uninsured Motorist Benefits Policy Limits - They Ain't What They Used To Be," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2011
    • Poyser v. Newman, Pa. Supreme Court 

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The “Innocent Plaintiff” Fair Share Argument Gains Momentum

October 1, 2022

Key Points: The federal court recently addressed the issue of the amount of credit due an underinsured motorist carrier. As part of its analysis, the court, in dicta, referenced a novel argument raised under the Fair Share Act. The good news is that the UIM carrier was entitled to a full credit of all underlying liability coverage irrespective of the Fair Share Act. The bad news is that the court predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will hold, especially in third-party liability cases, that the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act only applies where the plaintiffs’ negligence is in question. In Anderson v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 WL 2238955 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022), the plaintiffs sued third-party tortfeasors and settled all of their claims. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a claim for UIM benefits. That carrier denied the claim on the basis that the value of the claim did not exceed the combined $5.1 million liability limits of the various third-party tortfeasors. In this claim, the plaintiffs’ decedent was an “innocent plaintiff”—a passenger in a motor vehicle accident. The vehicles involved had aggregate policy limits of $5.1 million. The court noted that the carrier’s UIM endorsement stated that the carrier would only pay the UIM benefits if the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury or coverage policies had been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements. The carrier contended that it should receive a credit of $5.1 million. The plaintiffs’ theory in Anderson was a novel one. They attempted to argue that, unless the carrier could prove that one of the defendants’ percentage of fault equaled or exceeded 60%, the carrier should only be entitled to a credit equal to the amount that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to recover from the joint tortfeasors, or $650,000, which was the sum of the amounts actually paid in the settlement. The plaintiffs based their argument on the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act and its effect upon UIM coverage and joint and severability in Pennsylvania. The Anderson court found that there is no controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue of the enforcement of exhausting clauses related to UIM benefits. However, it did indicate that several Pennsylvania Superior Court cases have held that a UIM carrier was entitled to the full amount of any liability limits that were available from the third-party tortfeasor. The plaintiffs in Anderson attempted to make the argument that those decisions were no longer applicable due to the passage of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act. The court in its decision stated that, even if the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act altered the effect of these prior decisions, the plaintiffs’ argument still failed since the decedent’s negligence was not in question. Therefore, the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act would not apply. It cited other prior Pennsylvania cases which suggest that a plaintiff’s negligence must be at issue in a case for the Fair Share Act to apply. As a result, this Western District of Pennsylvania Federal case predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s negligence is not at issue and, as such, predicted that the Supreme Court would hold that traditional principles of joint and several liability, which existed before the Fair Share Act, would control . That is the bad news for carriers. The good news is that the court held that the language of the policy’s exhaustion clause in this case mandated that the UIM carrier was entitled to a credit for the full amount of liability limits available in the underlying third-party case, totaling $5.1 million. In conclusion, as per Anderson, any insurance carrier in Pennsylvania should evaluate whether or not there is any possible proof of negligence on the part of the plaintiff before it utilizes the Fair Share Act and its protections when evaluating such claims, in third-party liability cases and in UIM claims. *Ed is a senior counsel in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 610.354.8483 or ejtuite@mdwcg.com. Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.