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Dante C. Rohr

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DCRohr@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Dante C. Rohr

Dante concentrates his practice in complex litigation, with an emphasis on the defense of professionals, including lawyers, accountants, insurance brokers, real estate professionals and directors and officers in matters pertaining to malpractice, negligence and fraud. In addition, he has extensive experience defending architects and engineers, and construction defect matters. Dante also represents private companies as well as Housing Authorities in Florida in connection with employment, ADL, FHA, reasonable accommodation and discrimination claims made to state and federal agencies and courts. Dante additionally has extensive experience with insurance coverage and bad faith litigation, commercial litigation, and intellectual property matters. A trial attorney for over 20 years, Dante has litigated hundreds of cases in the state and federal courts of Florida, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and has tried cases to verdict in all three states. 

Dante is registered to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and his practice includes Federal and state litigation involving patents, copyright, trademarks and trade secrets. He has represented many clients in intellectual property actions including claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and trademark infringement and has represented clients in Federal and State Courts and before the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.

Dante also has significant admiralty and maritime law experience. As a member of the Maritime Litigation Practice Group, he has experience defending Jones Act claims, defending port facilities with regard to personal injury and property damage claims, maritime construction claims including pier and bulkhead collapses, cargo claims, vessel damage claims and limitation of liability actions.

Dante is admitted to the Bar in Florida, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the District of New Jersey and Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as in the Court of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits. Dante received his Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Drexel University and his juris doctor from Rutgers School of Law - Camden, New Jersey. Before joining the firm, Dante worked as an electrical design and control systems engineer in the manufacturing and machine design fields.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1998)
    • Drexel University (B.S., 1992)
    • New Jersey, 1998
    • Pennsylvania, 1998
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1998
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2005
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2006
    • New York, 2021
    • Florida, 2022
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2022
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Commercial Litigation (2024-2027)
    • American Intellectual Property Law Association
    • Maritime Law Association
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 2018
    • Contributing Author, IP Claims Quarterly, 2017-present
    • Defense verdict after trial on the plaintiff’s statutory claims seeking recovery on an allegedly dishonored check issued by our client.
    • Defense verdict in legal malpractice action where the plaintiff alleged dissatisfaction with the settlement of an environmental and property lawsuit.
    • Obtained an involuntary dismissal at close of plaintiff's case in a trucking case arising out of the recovery of a wreck on the Pennsylvania Turnpike.
    • Successfully represented an insurance broker in a malpractice action arising out of Superstorm Sandy.  After a week of trial and the barring of testimony be plaintiff’s damages expert, the plaintiff accepted a settlement proposal on the client’s terms.
    • Successfully represented a solar energy contractor in a breach of contract suit involving the installation of solar panels on numerous public schools in the State of Hawaii. The matter was tried for over three weeks by a three person binding arbitration panel. After the conclusion of our case in chief, the plaintiff accepted a settlement upon our client’s terms.
    • Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 824 Fed. Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2020). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of our client on the scope of additional insured coverage for liability arising out of the use of the leased premises.  Applying Pennsylvania’s “but for” causation standard, the court held that the customer would not have slipped in the parking lot but for her patronage of the gas station and store, thus finding the incident fell within the coverage provided by the additional insured endorsement.
    • Shirey v. Turner, 2017 WL 1709811 (E.D.Pa. 2017).  District Court granted our motion to dismiss for improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction.  Our client lived and worked in Las Vegas and never visited Pennsylvania.  The Court noted that even though our client admitted receiving faxes and calls from the plaintiff, those communications alone were irrelevant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction.  With no other relevant contacts to the forum, the Court found no jurisdiction to exist.
    • Mattson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 653 Fed. Appx. 145 (3d Cir. 2016).  Affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action under the NJ Civil Rights Act alleging communications from the insurer following submission of hospital bills arising from an auto accident were improper requests for payment. The Court held that the NJ Collateral Source Statute and Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act were not meant to benefit insureds, and neither were actionable under the CRA which only provided a cause of action for deprivations of certain rights protected by state law.
    • Morse v. Kaplan, 468 Fed. Apx. 171 (3d Cir. 2012).  An attorney-debt collector was sued in a purported class action, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim arising from debt collection letters sent on behalf of her client. The District Court granted our motion for summary judgment finding no violation of the FDCPA which was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Plaintiff had contended that the debt collection letters were false and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. The Third Circuit, applying the "least sophisticated consumer" standard to the debt collection letters sent out by the attorney on behalf of her client agreed with our position that the letters at issue were neither false nor misleading because they were written in the first person "I shall" throughout, it was clear that it is the attorney-debt collector who will assume the debt is valid if there is no response to the letter within 30 days, and the letter is not required to inform the debtor that the debt collector will provide the debtor with the name of the original creditor when, as was the case here, the creditor is the original creditor.
    • Boro Construction, Inc. v. Lenape Reg. High School Dist. Bd. of Edu. v. Digeronimo/Mikula Assoc., 445 Fed. Appx. 498 (3d Cir. 2011).  General contractor on project to construct a 400-meter running track for school district filed suit against the district alleging breach of contract. The school district filed a third party complaint against our client, the track designer, alleging that track failed to meet specifications. Specifically that it was not 400 meters. On appeal after trial in the district court, the Third Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of our client. The trial court found that the school district’s expert made a surveying error from which it concluded that the track did not meet specifications. As a result, the district had the track resurfaced and relined. The trial court rejected the district’s expert and credited DiGeronimo's testimony that the track as originally laid out and lined was 400 meters and met all contract specifications.
    • West v. American Honda Motor Co., 2008 WL 4104683 (D.N.J. 2008).  The district court granted our motion to dismiss on behalf of Honda for insufficiency of services of process and because the plaintiff failed to set forth a claim under the NJ Product Liability Act.
    • Maiale v. Procaccino, 2005 WL 3675330 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2005).  Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of our client after baring plaintiff from presenting testimony of any expert witnesses.

Results

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Summary Judgment Obtained in Contractual Indemnity and Defense Case

We obtained summary judgment in favor of our client on the plaintiff’s general contractor’s contractual indemnity and defense claims. The general contractor claimed it was owed defense and indemnity under its subcontract with our client. In a prior proceeding, the court entered judgment in favor of the owner against the general contractor for breach of contract and breach of warranty but rejected the owner’s claims of negligence and violation of the Florida Building Code. The court agreed with our arguments that the general contractor was estopped from bringing its contractual defense and indemnity claims against the subcontractor because there was a prior judicial determination that neither the general contractor nor our client was negligent, and the general contractor’s liability was based on its breach of contract and warranties. The court further agreed that the general contractor could not show that the subcontractor was negligent, where it had taken the position that there was no negligence in the construction and it did not present any affirmative evidence to support a claim of negligence on the part of the subcontractor.   

Florida Court Affirms Arbitrator’s Decision in Construction Defect Case

We successfully upheld an arbitrator’s ruling in a $13 million construction defect case, defeating claims that our client negligently recommended windows and doors for a coastal Florida home. The owners’ direct claims against the general contractor and our client, the window and door supplier and installer, were arbitrated. The owners claimed the window company misrepresented the fitness of the windows and doors for use in Florida’s coastal environment. We argued that the windows and doors were specified by the owner and architect and that our client performed proper due diligence by visiting the manufacturing facility and consulting with the manufacturer’s engineers with regard to the application. The arbitrator found no liability as to our client because there was no evidence it was negligent in its recommendation of the product.

Thought Leadership

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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

July 1, 2024

Florida Court of Appeal Holds that Illinois Law Firm Subject to Jurisdiction of State of Florida in Connection with Legal Malpractice Lawsuit Brought by Personal Representatives of Deceased Father’s Florida Estate Neal Gerber & Eisenberg, LLP v. Lamb-Ferrara, --- So.3d --- (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) In 2008, Matthew Lamb and his wife retained the Illinois law firm of Neal Gerber to prepare their wills and estate plans. Mr. Lamb, a prominent artist owning considerable property and assets around the world, designated Florida as his domicile in his will and estate plans. He passed away in 2012, and his widow as executor of the will, retained Neal Gerber in connection with the Estate. On Neal Gerber’s advice, she retained Florida counsel to commence probate proceedings in Florida. Mrs. Lamb resigned as executor and personal representative and was replaced by her daughter, Sheila Lamb-Gabler, pursuant to the terms of the will. Neal Gerber continued its engagement after Ms. Lamb-Gabler became the Estate’s personal representative and did not formally terminate its engagement until 2019.  The Lambs’ two other daughters, as successor personal representatives of the estate, brought a malpractice suit against Neal Gerber alleging negligence in drafting the estate documents and handling the probate action. On appeal, the court upheld jurisdiction over Neal Gerber on the basis that Florida’s Long-Arm Statute may extend to non-resident defendants that perform estate services for an estate probated in Florida even where legal services may have been performed outside of Florida. The court rejected Neal Gerber’s arguments that its work was performed in Illinois; it never filed a notice of appearance or appeared as counsel of record in Florida; and had no office or presence in Florida when it admitted that is was retained by the Estate, which was probated in Florida, and drafted, reviewed and approved filings in the Florida probate action. The court further found that constitutional due process was satisfied based on the firm’s rendering estate planning services to Mr. Lamb with full awareness that he was domiciled in Florida and his will would be probated in Florida. Neal Gerber directed local counsel’s actions and prepared and filed the majority of filings in the Probate Action.  Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that Illinois counsel should have reasonably foreseen being hauled into court in Florida for issues arising from the activities it directed into Florida.    Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Firm Highlights

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars