.

Daniel P. McGannon

Portrait of Daniel P. McGannon

Dan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice in matters related to school leaders' liability, employment law, municipal liability and civil rights law. He has litigated cases before state and federal courts, as well as the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 

Dan has an established legal career in both the public and private sector. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, he was the director of policy and legal affairs for a large public school district counseling the district in a variety of matters such as employment, contract, and general school law matters. He also previously was an attorney with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General where he counseled and litigated on behalf of Commonwealth agencies in matters regarding employment, constitutional claims, and contract matters. With his extensive legal background, Dan is adept at identifying and mitigating legal risks for clients. 

Dan holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Shippensburg University and a juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in all Pennsylvania state courts as well as the United States District Court for the Middle District, Eastern District and Western District of Pennsylvania, and The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Outside of work, Dan is very active in his community coaching youth sports and moderating various activities through his local parish.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2010)
    • Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Labor & Employment Section
    • NAGTRI Instructor

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

January 1, 2026

PA Supreme Court Provides Flexibility to Municipal and School Boards under the Sunshine Act with Its Ruling in Coleman v. Parkland School District Background A dispute arose regarding the 2021 amendments to the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act (Act 65). These amendments required agencies (including school boards and borough councils) to post meeting agendas at least 24 hours in advance of a public meeting and generally prohibited taking official action on items not listed on those pre-meeting agendas. In October 2021, the Parkland School Board added a vote to ratify a teachers' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to its agenda during a public meeting. However, the board only learned of the contract's ratification by the union shortly before the meeting began. A resident, Jarrett Coleman, challenged the vote, arguing it violated the Sunshine Act because the CBA was not on the 24-hour posted agenda and did not meet the specific "emergency" or "de minimis" exceptions listed in the Act. The Commonwealth Court initially ruled against the District, holding that agencies could only add items if they fell into three narrow categories: (1) emergencies, (2) matters arising 24 hours before the meeting that are de minimis, or (3) matters raised by a resident during the meeting that are de minimis. The District appealed, setting the stage for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision. The Decision The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the School District’s victory. Justice Donohue, writing for the majority, focused on a strict plain language interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act. The "Fourth Exception": The court held that the statute’s use of the disjunctive "or" in Section 712.1(a)—which references subsections (b), (c), (d), or (e)—indicates that there are four independent exceptions to the 24-hour notice rule. The Court determined that Section 712.1(e), often called the "Majority Vote Clause," is a standalone exception. It allows an agency to add any matter of business to the agenda during a meeting, provided they follow specific procedural steps. The “spirit of the law” argument was rejected by the majority, explaining that the Commonwealth Court had essentially "redrafted" the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that if the text is unambiguous, the court cannot ignore the literal interpretation of the law to pursue its perceived intent. Takeaways For solicitors and legal counsel representing Pennsylvania municipal bodies and school districts, the Coleman ruling provides much-needed flexibility, but requires strict procedural adherence. The Coleman decision removes the “de minimis” requirement to Majority Votes under the Sunshine Act. Given that agencies have a majority vote to create a last-minute addition to an agenda, they no longer need to prove that it is an "emergency" or "minor" (de minimis). However, local agencies must follow the Four-Step Procedural Mandate to lawfully add an item under the "Majority Vote" exception. Practitioners must ensure their clients:  1.    Announce the reasons for the change publicly before the vote. 2.    Conduct a separate majority vote to amend the agenda before voting on the substance of the item. 3.    Post the amended agenda online and at the principal office by the next business day. 4.    Record the reasons and the vote clearly in the meeting minutes. Solicitors or attorneys representing local agency clients would be wise to monitor legislation by the General Assembly in response to the Coleman decision. The Assembly may respond with further clarification to the Act in the event of potential “absurd” results cautioned by some justices and whether the “broad flexibility” offered by the Coleman decision is, in fact, what the legislature intended.  Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.  

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

December 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Expands School Notification Requirements for Weapons Incidents Last month, Governor Shapiro signed Act No. 2025-44, which amends Pennsylvania’s School Code. Specifically, the new law requires Pennsylvania schools to notify parents and educators within 24 hours when a student is found in possession of a weapon on school property, school transportation or at a school-sponsored activity.  The Bill aims to increase transparency and school safety by requiring schools to use communications methods “likely to reach” (e.g., phone, email, SMS) parents and staff impacted by a student’s possession of a weapon. In instances where the student possesses a weapon in a school building, the District should notify only parents and staff directly involved. However, the law requires broader dissemination of a student’s weapon possession when the student possesses the weapon on a multi-building campus. In such a case, all staff and parents with students in the other on-campus buildings must be notified. The law further states that notices of student weapon possessions discovered at “school-sponsored activities” should be directed to “the appropriate population” impacted by the weapon possession.  Importantly, Districts are not required to include personally identifiable information in their notices to parents and staff. Further, Districts must provide more detailed information to families and staff with “legitimate educational interests” in the student who possessed the weapon.  Districts must continue to report weapon possession incidents to the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE). In addition, Districts must also continue to report weapon possessions that constitute violations of 24 P.S. § 1317.2 (Possession of weapons prohibited), 18 Pa.C.S. § 912 (Possession of weapon on school property), or any other weapon identified by District policy or local ordinance.  As with any new legislation, there is language in Act 44 that may prove ambiguous, such as what constitutes notification “likely to reach” staff and parents. However, Pennsylvania school districts should discuss updates to their policies with their solicitors to ensure compliance with Act 44’s new requirements, review FERPA requirements with staff to ensure personally identifiable information is not disclosed to unintended parties, and review and refine notification workflows. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.