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Corey K. Setterlund

Portrait of Corey K.  Setterlund

As a member of the firm's Professional Liability Department, Corey focuses her practice on representing and defending insurance companies in insurance coverage disputes and first-party property litigation.  

Corey is a 2005 graduate of Florida Atlantic University where she received her bachelors' degree in History and Political Science.  She received her juris doctor in 2011 from Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center. While in law school, Corey was a subscriptions and articles editor for the ILSA Journal for International and Comparative Law.  She also interned at the Broward County Court Family Law division under Judge Melinda Kirsch-Brown. 

Outside of the office, Corey is a passionate ultra marathon runner. In May 2019, she was the #1 overall female finisher and the second overall finisher in the Dunes 50 Miler, an off-road running race in Hobe Sound, Florida. The course includes hard-packed single track trails and several miles of rolling loose sugar sand dunes. Corey finished the 50-mile course in a little over 14 hours.

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., 2011)
    • Florida Atlantic University (B.A., 2005)
    • Florida, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2020
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2021
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Insurance Law (2022-2025)
    • “Florida’s New Property Insurance Statute Changes Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs in First Party Homeowner’s Insurance Cases,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021
    • "Help for Florida Insurers Drowning in Water Damage Claims," Insurance Journal, Florida Edition, November 2019
    • “Scope! Scope! Scope! Diaz v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company and Its Effect on the Insurer’s Option to Repair,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2017

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

June 11, 2026

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Sixth DCA Affirms Insureds May Present Replacement‑Cost Evidence After Wrongful Claim Denial

March 1, 2026

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez and Cuevas, Case No. 6D2024-1194, 2026 WL 370220 (Fla. 6th DCA Feb. 6, 2026). Universal issued a homeowners’ insurance policy to the plaintiffs, which provided replace cost value for covered damages. The subject policy stated it would pay, at the least, actual cash value of the loss less than any deductible, then pay any “remaining amounts necessary to perform such repairs as work is performed and expenses are incurred.”  After issuance, the plaintiffs filed a claim for damages caused by a storm. Universal denied the claim for damage and the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. During trial, the plaintiffs testified that they did not make any repairs yet and, over Universal’s objection, presented a contractor’s estimate of the replacement cost value of the repairs necessary to fix the property. Universal argued that since no repairs had been made, the correct measure of damages was actual cash value, per the terms of the subject policy. The trial court overruled Universal’s objection to the replacement cost value estimate, presented and overruled a Motion of Limine and, after the jury ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, a motion for directed verdict regarding exclusion of the replacement cost value estimate. Universal appealed the decision. The Sixth DCA reviewed Florida Statute Section 627.7011(3)(a), which has similar language to Universal’s policy provision regarding replacement cost value and initially paying actual cash value. The court noted that the Second, Third, and Fourth DCAs had recently opined on the issue at hand: may policy language that allows a carrier to deny a claim, and, when an insured sues their carrier for coverage, bar the insured from presenting evidence of replacement cost value, as the policy initially requires payment of actual cash value? The Third DCA determined that an insured can present replacement cost value evidence, finding that Florida Statute §627.7011(3)(a) is based on the carrier providing coverage for the loss, not an insured suing their carrier for breach of contract after wrongfully denying the claim. The Fourth DCA came to the opposite conclusion. However, there was an important fact that the Fourth had to consider: the insureds sold their property without making any repairs. Thus, repairs by the insureds could never be made. The Sixth DCA followed the opinions of the Second and Third DCAs (and the dissenting opinion from the Fourth DCA), finding that the language of the policy and Florida Statute are for “covered property loss” not during litigation when a carrier has been accused of wrongfully denying a claim. While Universal argued that the opinion is in conflict with Citizens Prop. Ins. Co. v. Manor House, LLC, 313 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2021), the court explained that the specific issue in Manor House was extra-contractual consequential damages, not evidence of contractual damages. As a result, the decision was affirmed.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.