.

Christopher M. Reeser

Portrait of Christopher M. Reeser

With 29 years of litigation experience in a diverse range of practice areas, Chris represents and defends clients in matters involving motor vehicle, premises liability, construction defect and pharmacy liability. His deep understanding of these areas and breadth of experience is a valuable asset to his clients. Chris also serves as the Casualty Supervisor and Managing Attorney of the Harrisburg office. In this capacity, he oversees the day-to-day operations for the entire office and team of attorneys ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively.

Chris has represented several large and small automobile insurance carriers and their insureds, numerous hotels, conference centers, and hotel chains as well as grocery store chains, convenience stores, retail stores, pharmacies, and industrial facilities. Chris has defended a number of significant and catastrophic cases involving injuries on building and roadway construction sites. He has also handled a number of underinsured motorist arbitrations and has extensive experience with mediation and arbitration. 

Chris also defends fraternal organizations, schools and universities in matters involving contractual disputes, indemnity, dram shop and general negligence. He has counseled and represented clients in matters related to insurance coverage and professional liability. Additionally, he handles cases involving elevators, escalators, moving walkways, electronic doorways, cranes and lifts representing clients in alleged elevator, escalator malfunctions and negligent maintenance.

During his career, Chris has had significant experience handling several hundred motor vehicle matters involving third-party liability, uninsured and underinsured motorist claims along with several hundred premises liability cases. He has litigated jury trials to verdict in 15 different counties in state from South Central Pennsylvania to the Northern tier as well as in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Chris has also been appointed by the President Judge of Dauphin County on multiple occasions to serve as an arbitrator, including a two-year term in which he was asked to serve as the Chairman of an arbitration panel. 

Chris is a graduate of Albright College in Reading and the Widener University School of Law in Harrisburg. Chris started practice in Williamsport, working with a small litigation firm. He joined the Williamsport office of Marshall Dennehey in 1997 as an associate and he was elected a shareholder in 2002. In 2004, Chris returned to his hometown of Harrisburg to work in our Harrisburg office.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1994)
    • Albright College (B.A., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2007
    • Maryland, 2016
    • U.S. District Court District of Maryland, 2020
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2027)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022-2025, 2027)
    • Central Penn Business Journal "Power List For Law" (2025)
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Fundamentals of Personal Injury, June 2014
    • Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act - PAMIC Claims Summit, March, 2012
    • Basics of Auto Law – Defense Perspective, September 2012
    • Handling the Auto Injury Claim: Settle the Case Without Going to Court, National Business Institute, August 2008 
    • Releases and Settlements - Tactics, Tips and Techniques, 2007 PAMIC Summit 
    • Tort Claims Act, Pennsylvania Association of Township Supervisors 
    • Two Scoops: Superior Court Allows UM/UIM Claimants to Double Dip Workers' Compensation Benefits, Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3, September, 2005
    • Superior Court Holds New Trial is Warranted Whenever Jury Seeks Own Expert Opinion, Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, September, 2003
    • A defense verdict in a toxic tort case in which the plaintiff claimed neuro-cognitive deficits as a result of exposure to pesticide which was applied in her home.  The plaintiff had called preiminent experts from around the country in the fields of industrial hygiene, occupational medicine, neurotoxicology and pesticide application in support of her claim.  The jury found that our client, a large pest control company, was not negligent. 
    • Successful defense of a subrogation claim brought against the manufacturer of a lighting fixture in which it was claimed that the design of the light caused the fire to occur.  We were able to establish that the fire was not caused by the design of the light but instead by the misuse of the product by the homeowner, who did not follow the warnings contained on the light regarding its use in conjunction with a salt water aquarium. 
    • Successfully obtaining the dismissal of a fraud claim against a client during trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania which greatly reduced the insured's exposure in a fire loss case at a commercial facility.  The dismissal of the fraud claim insulated our client, a small company, from uninsured exposure. 
    • Successfully defending a large tree cutting company in a case in which it was alleged that an employee of the company was negligent in assisting a mechanic who was performing repairs to the hydraulic system on a boom truck resulting in a crush injury to the mechanic in which he lost a portion of bone in his forearm following contraction of MRSA.
    • Successfully defending a nail salon in a fall down case in which the plaintiff claimed that she was improperly escorted to a chair following a pedicure and had to undergo a multi-level cervical fusion as a result of her fall. 
    • Successfully defended a claim against a pharmacy in which the plaintiff, a physician, was dispensed an antipsychotic medication instead of his usual beta blocker. As a result, the plaintiff claimed post traumatic stress disorder and a permanent loss of income as a result of suffering stroke-like conditions requiring him to be life flighted to a hospital. The jury concluded that the plaintiff did not sustain post traumatic stress disorder and suffered no permanent physical injury and awarded only a nominal amount of money. 
    • Successfully defended a fraternal organization which was sued as a result of an alleged assault by a security guard against an animal rights protestor outside of a circus. The jury concluded that the assault did not occur and the case resulted in a defense verdict. 
    • Gandhi v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2020 WL 7769776
    • Marks v. The Reserve at Hershey Meadows, LEXIS 47325 (U.S. Dist. 2007)
    • Calhoun v. Prudential General Ins. Co., LEXIS 44302 (U.S. Dist. 2005)
    • Allstate v. Leiter, 306 F.Supp. 2d 488 (M.D. Pa. 2004)

Results

Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Premises and Product Liability Case

We won a motion for summary judgment in Schuylkill County, PA, in a premises liability and product liability case. We represented the manufacturer of a concrete railroad crossing that was installed at an intersection in 2005. In 2021, the plaintiff was riding his bike across the crossing when his bike tire allegedly became stuck in a gap in the concrete. There was ample evidence that the railroad was responsible for inspecting and maintaining the crossing while our client did nothing other than supply the prefabricated crossing. We argued the gap that developed in the crossing was not the responsibility of the crossing manufacturer and that the statute of repose barred the lawsuit. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.