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Christin L. Kochel

Portrait of Christin L. Kochel

Christin is a member of the Casualty Department where she defends clients in the areas of amusement, sports, and recreation matters. Christin routinely represents and defends a wide range of clients in this space, including sports and recreation facility owners, coaches, instructors, youth athletic organizations, professional athletes, educational institutions, and college fraternities against various claims and suits brought against them.

Christin also has significant experience handling a wide variety of cases in the areas of insurance defense, coverage matters and civil litigation, with a focus on automobile liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist claims. She has also represented and defended clients in premises liability, homeowner's insurance, minor's compromise, and other general liability claims and suits brought against them.

Throughout her legal career, Christin has litigated cases in almost every county in the eastern portion of Pennsylvania as well as the federal courts. She has also resolved countless cases for her clients via arbitration and mediation.

In 2007, Christin earned her juris doctor from Widener University Delaware Law School. While in law school, Christin was a member of the Moot Court Honor Society and Moe Levine Trial Advocacy Society. In 2004, she graduated cum laude from Bloomsburg University.

Christin is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania as well as the United States District Courts for both the Middle and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. She is also a member of the American Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Berks County Bar Association, where she served as the past president of the Young Lawyers Section.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2007)
    • Commonwealth University - Bloomsburg (B.A., cum laude, 2004)
    • New Jersey, 2008
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2015
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019-2023)
    • American Bar Association
    • Berks County Bar Association, Young Lawyers Division, Past President
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Obtained a successful defense award involving a significant claim. Plaintiff and his wife filed a claim against their insurer for underinsured motorist benefits after Plaintiff was struck as a pedestrian by a drunk driver. Plaintiff sustained several fractures of his body and also claimed neck and back injuries and significant damages, including future medical expenses. The case proceeded to a high/low Binding Arbitration. The Arbitrator awarded the low on the case, showing that Christin and the insurer properly evaluated the claim. 
    • Obtained a favorable defense verdict at a Philadelphia Common Pleas Arbitration. Plaintiff, a healthcare provider, filed suit against the insurance company for unpaid medical bills, punitive damages, interest and attorney’s fees, for treatment it rendered to the insured’s daughter. At the Arbitration, Christin argued that the insurance company properly evaluated the claim based on whether the insured’s daughter was entitled to benefits as it had not been determined that the daughter was residing with her mother at the time of the accident. Therefore, Christin argued that Plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages, interest and attorney’s fees. The Arbitrators agreed and only awarded the Plaintiff health provider its past medical expenses, which Christin and the insurance company stipulated to. The Plaintiff was not awarded punitive damages, interest or attorney’s fees.
    • Settled a case at Mediation for less than a third of the settlement authority. The case involved a Plaintiff allegedly slipping and falling on a slippery substance in a parking lot in Philadelphia. After Christin obtained favorable defense opinions from both liability and medical experts, Plaintiff significantly reduced the value of her claim and settled the case.
    • Obtained a favorable decision dismissing all claims and cross-claims against her client in a motor vehicle accident case in Philadelphia via a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The plaintiff filed a Complaint on April 1, 2022 alleging several injuries due to a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff sued several defendants, including the rental car company that owned one of the vehicles involved in the accident. Citing to the rental agreement and the policies covering the rental vehicle, Christin argued that the rental driver was not authorized to operate the vehicle as he rented the vehicle under false pretenses, permitted an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle, and operated the vehicle for hire in violation of the policies. The Court ruled in the rental company’s favor finding there was no coverage under the policies pursuant to Pennsylvania case law and the policy language cited by Christin in the Motion. All claims and cross-claims were dismissed against the rental company. 
    • Obtained a favorable jury trial award in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania in a motor vehicle accident case in which the plaintiff was claiming a low back injury with almost $1 million in claimed past and future damages. Liability was admitted. The jury awarded the plaintiff just $20,000 in future medical expenses and pain and suffering. The plaintiff's counsel tried to have the jury's decision dismissed, but the court denied the request.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in Berks County, Pennsylvania following an underinsured motorist coverage jury trial. Following the motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sustained an injury to her left heel and foot consisting of a fracture that required a plate and screws to be placed in her foot. The plaintiff was requesting a significant amount for past and future pain and suffering and future medical expenses, including a future left foot surgery. The jury returned an award in favor of the plaintiff totaling $28,000. After applying the third-party credit, the jury award was reduced down to $0.
    • Motion for Summary Judgment granted in a Declaratory Judgment action in which the plaintiff was claiming his vehicle damage was covered by his insurance policy. At the time of the loss, the plaintiff did not have collision coverage on his vehicle, only comprehensive coverage. The plaintiff argued that his vehicle was still covered by the comprehensive portion of his auto insurance policy, claiming the vehicle that rolled down a hill and struck his parked vehicle was considered a "falling object." After arguing that Pennsylvania case law and the insurance policy language did not cover the plaintiff's losses, the court agreed and granted the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania in which the plaintiff was claiming a neck and low back injury after being involved in a rear end motor vehicle accident. Liability was admitted. Although the plaintiff had no prior history of neck or back injuries, the jury returned an award in favor of the defesne, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove he sustained an injury that was caused by the accident. The defense expert testified that the plaintiff's MRI films from after the accident showed pre-existing findings that were not caused by the accident. Further, although the jury did not have to reach a decision on the limited tort issue, the jury also found that the plaintiff's injuries did not breach limited tort.
    • Have obtained many favorable decisions granting Motions for Summary Judgment on limited tort throughout Pennsylvania, which decisions have been affirmed on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Case Involving a Trampoline Park Injury

We obtained summary judgment in a lawsuit arising from an injury suffered at an indoor trampoline park. During the deposition, the plaintiff admitted that there are inherent risks of engaging in trampoline activities, including the risk of being injured. Under the no-duty rule, a defendant owes no duty of care to warn, protect, or insure against risks which are common, frequent, expected and inherent in an activity. In the motion for summary judgment, it was argued that a trampoline park has no duty to protect patrons from the inherent risks of injury when jumping from a trampoline. The court opined that the no-duty rule was implicated and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.

Defense Verdict Obtained in Case Involving Motor Vehicle Accident

We obtained a defense verdict after a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, which found the plaintiff did not meet the definition of an insured entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was a back seat passenger in a vehicle that was struck by the tortfeasor. After settling his bodily injury claim with the tortfeasor and with the underlying UIM carrier that insured the vehicle he was a passenger in, the plaintiff submitted a UIM claim seeking UIM benefits under his alleged sister’s UIM policy with our client. There was no dispute the plaintiff was living with his “sister” at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only issue was whether the plaintiff could show he was an insured and entitled to coverage by proving he was related to his “sister” by blood, adoption or marriage to meet the definition of a “family member” under the policy. She testified during discovery and at trial that she is not related to the plaintiff by blood, adoption or marriage. As a result of this testimony, the judge found the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and entered a defense verdict for our client. 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

June 30, 2026

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.