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Christian D. Marquis

Portrait of Christian D. Marquis

Christian's practice includes the defense of professionals, public entities, police officers and public officials. He has handled numerous cases defending public entities and public officials in matters involving general negligence and intentional tort claims, land use and zoning issues including municipal statutory appeals, mandamus and inverse condemnation claims, and administrative regulatory issues. He also defends public entities, public officials and police officers in civil rights actions including land use and zoning denials, unlawful use of force, wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and also wrongful termination and discrimination claims.

Christian has significant experience representing architects and engineers, construction contractors, home and code inspectors, real estate agents and other professionals in the defense of professional and general negligence, construction injuries and accidents, construction defect and breach of contract claims. He also defends clients in personal injury, commercial, environmental and toxic tort litigation matters, more recently surrounding fracking related to natural gas drilling. Christian has tried and handled cases in state and federal courts.

In 1995, Christian graduated from St. Vincent College with a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics. In 1996, he graduated from the Pennsylvania State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in chemical engineering.  He then earned his juris doctor from the New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts, in 1999.

    • New England Law | Boston (J.D., 1999)
    • The Pennsylvania State University (B.S., 1996)
    • Saint Vincent College (B.A., 1995)
    • Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2007
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, "Lawyer of the Year," Pittsburgh, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendant (2019)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2014-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Municipal (2014-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2005-2006)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • “Taking vs. Tort: Which Is It in Relation to Sanitary Sewer Overflows?,” Defense Digest, March 2021, Vol. 27, No. 2
    • "The First Amendment's Protection Applies To Certain Comments Directed Toward Police Officers," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 4, December, 2007
    • "Nanty-Glo Rule Applies to Preliminary Objections Raising Issues of Fact," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1, March, 2004
    • After the completion of discovery, successfully obtained settlement of less than $42,000 on behalf of a police department and its officer arising out of a family dispute where seven family members filed Section 1983 civil rights claims alleging malicious and retaliatory prosecution where the initial demand was over $750,000.
    • In a case where a plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights claim based on alleged unlawful excessive use of force where a police canine, upon the command of its controlling officer, grabbed the plaintiff's abdomen, taking him to the ground and resulting in puncture wounds. Obtained a settlement of $20,000 where the plaintiff's demand was $250,000.
    • Currently handling a case on behalf of a roofing contractor where the plaintiff school district is alleging against multiple parties that the roof was improperly constructed, resulting in roof leakage associated damages in excess of $600,000.
    • Currently handling a case on behalf of a civil engineering and surveying firm resulting from an allegedly improperly designed storm water management system associated with a land development plan. Decedent's estate has raised claims against multiple parties that storm water drainage formed ice on a state road, causing decedent's accident.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a municipal authority wherein plaintiffs claimed damages in excess of $75,000 as a result of a landslide that impacted their property allegedly as a result of a defective sanitary sewer line and corresponding trenching.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a township wherein a plaintiff alleged that she sustained various personal injuries as a result of a motor vehicle versus tractor trailer accident that was allegedly caused by a defective traffic signal.
    • Successfully obtained a favorable decision on appeal before the Commonwealth Court in a reported decision on behalf of a borough and its council on the basis of high public official immunity wherein a plaintiff sought damages as a result of being debarred during a public meeting by the council from bidding on public works contracts.
    • Obtained a jury defense verdict on behalf of a township wherein a plaintiff alleged that he sustained a foot fracture after stepping into an uncovered utility trench.
    • Obtained a non-jury defense verdict on behalf of a city wherein a plaintiff alleged that his rental property sustained damages as a result of a sanitary sewer back-up.
    • Obtained a decision in favor of a home inspector after binding arbitration wherein a plaintiff alleged that the inspector was negligent for failing to discover the existence of mold during a home inspection.
    • Obtained a non-jury defense verdict on behalf of a police officer wherein a plaintiff alleged unlawful use of force during the course of an arrest.
    • Successfully negotiated a favorable settlement in the amount of $15,000 on behalf of a township wherein a police officer who demanded $75,000 alleged wrongful termination from the township police department in violation of his equal protection rights.
    • Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)
    • Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 398 F. Supp. 2d 400 (W.D. Pa. 2005)

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained for School District in Slip-and-Fall Case

We secured summary judgment on behalf of a school district in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged he sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from a loading dock when making a delivery to a middle school in the school district. He argued that the loading dock was dangerous due to inappropriate depth, causing boxes on his hand truck to strike a wall, thus pushing him off of the loading dock. The court concluded that, because of the plaintiff’s prior uneventful encounters with the loading dock, the plaintiff was aware of the intricacies of the loading dock. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiff was an experienced delivery driver who, as indicated, was in the best position to perceive whether conditions were dangerous or not, and was, thus, in the best position to take appropriate precautions for his safety. Therefore, the court held that the defendants had no duty to warn or otherwise act to protect the plaintiff.

Successful Appeal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Insurer

We successfully appealed a summary judgment in favor of an insurance client that had been sued by another insurance carrier for more than $1.6 million in damages arising out of a fire loss to an insured auto repair facility. The opposing insurance company had paid $1.6 million in damages and intended to pursue a product liability claim against a vehicle manufacturer, alleging a defectively manufactured vehicle had caused the fire. Our client insured the vehicle that was allegedly defective. After the insurance companies conducted a preliminary expert evaluation, the vehicle was destroyed by a salvage yard in the normal course of business. A claim was made against our client for promissory estoppel where it was alleged the vehicle was destroyed despite a promise to preserve. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County’s rejection of the claims against our client and agreed with our contention that the promissory estoppel claim was a disguised claim for negligent spoliation, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does not recognize. 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Taking vs. Tort: Which Is It in Relation to Sanitary Sewer Overflows?

March 1, 2021

Key Points: To constitute a taking, purposeful and deliberate action is required. A corrective action plan with the aim of reducing inflow and infiltration in a sanitary sewer system is evidence against the finding of a taking with respect to overflows. The failure to replace piping in an aging sanitary sewer system due to the lack of sufficient public funding does not constitute deliberate and purposeful action. In Matter of Franklin Township Sewage Authority, 233 A.3d 1014 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), the Commonwealth Court clarified the standard to distinguish whether a landowner damaged by repeated sanitary sewer overflows may claim that his property has been “taken” in the context of an inverse condemnation under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code or whether the landowner is limited to a common law tort claim. Often this issue presents a dilemma to attorneys on both sides of the “v” in determining the legal theory applicable to the prosecution or defense of a case. Given the aging sanitary sewer infrastructure in most urban and suburban areas of Pennsylvania, coupled with the lack of sufficient public funding, this problem frequently presents itself in civil actions when damages are alleged that, if proved, might amount to the full-value level of a “taking,” although a common law tort theory such as negligence has been pleaded. In Franklin Township, the landowner commenced an inverse condemnation action by filing a petition for the appointment of a board of viewers against the Franklin Township Municipal Sanitary Authority (Authority), contending that a de facto taking of his property had resulted from repeated sanitary sewer overflows that occurred in November 2003, August 2007, and October 2012. The Authority filed preliminary objections, asserting that the petition was barred because the landowner’s proper redress was by way of a tort action. After an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, the preliminary objections were sustained, and an appeal to the Commonwealth Court followed. It was agreed that the sanitary sewer overflows onto the landowner’s property were caused by significant rainfalls that resulted in inflow and infiltration into the aging sanitary sewer system, which primarily consisted of terra cotta piping. Because the Authority attempted to reduce inflow and infiltration through a corrective action plan that involved inspections and repairs that did not intend to allow inflow and infiltration into its system, it was determined that the Authority had made a good faith attempt to fix the problem. The evidence also demonstrated that the problem could not have been eliminated unless the Authority had spent approximately $245 million to replace over 245 miles of piping. However, as with most local agencies owning aging infrastructure, the Authority did not have sufficient funding to upgrade its system. The court noted the following standard to prove a de facto taking: (1) [the] condemnor has the power to condemn the land under eminent domain procedures; (2) exceptional circumstances have substantially deprived the [landowner] of the use and enjoyment of the property; and (3) the damages sustained were the immediate, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Franklin Township, 233 A.3d at 1021 (citation omitted). The court also stated that a “de facto taking must result from the governmental body’s actual exercise of the power of eminent domain.” Critical to whether a taking occurs, the court also stated, “[t]he injury complained of [must] [be] a direct result of intentional action by an entity incidental to its exercise of its eminent domain power.” In affirming the trial court, the court in Franklin Township indicated that the facts were more akin to those considered in the Commonwealth Court’s unreported opinion of In re Condemnation by the Youngwood Borough Authority, 2014 WL 10298904 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 5, 2014) rather than those found in the case of In re Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Authority, 166 A.3d 553 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). The latter case, cited by the landowner, was found to involve a taking, primarily because the authority chose to operate its system in a manner that would result in sanitary sewer overflows due to the design of its system. Therefore, the overflows resulted from a purposeful and deliberate drainage plan. However, the court in Franklin Township essentially adopted the holding in the unreported Youngwood Borough Authority opinion, in essence making it precedential based on similar facts. The original sewer system of the Authority operated as intended when it was first constructed in 1968-69, utilizing terra cotta pipes. Since 2003, the landowner’s property had flooded as a result of inflow from illegally connected downspouts and infiltration due to cracks, breaks and separations that are natural to aging terra cotta pipes. The Authority had not intended to have inflow and infiltration in its system and had a corrective action plan that included a lateral inspection program to identify and repair problems. Furthermore, the Authority had even installed a check valve on the landowner’s property that stopped basement flooding, although sewage still flowed into a retention pond on the property a few times a year. Therefore, the court held that a de facto taking had not occurred because the landowner’s injury had not resulted from a purposeful or deliberate action by the Authority with respect to the manner in which it chose to operate its system. Of particular significance with respect to Pennsylvania’s aging sanitary sewer infrastructure was the court’s consideration of the evidence related to the cost to remediate the Authority’s terra cotta pipe sewage system. The trial court addressed this issue through the landowner’s argument that the Authority’s failure to replace the terra cotta piping was a deliberate and purposeful action amounting to a de facto taking. The court disagreed with the landowner, holding that, because of the lack of adequate funding, the choice to replace the entire system was not even on the table to consider. The choice would only have been available if the funding existed, and, only then, could the court have potentially found that the failure to replace the system was deliberate and purposeful so as to constitute a de facto taking.  *Christian is a shareholder and works in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office. He can be reached at 412.803.1142 or cdmarquis@mdwcg.com. Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.