Carolin also represents condominium association boards in directors and officers suits, as well as real estate agents, brokers and appraisers in errors and omissions claims. She also concentrates a portion of her practice, litigating FDCPA claims and suits brought by debtors, against the collection services assigned to recover the debt.
Before joining Marshall Dennehey, Carolin was an Assistant Public Defender with the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in Orange and Osceola County. She focused her practice on criminal defense for indigent clients. During this time, she litigated various cases ranging from criminal traffic infractions to property damage and violent crimes from initial arrest to jury trial and sentencing.
Carolin graduated from the University of Central Florida in 2008 with a Bachelor of Arts in Legal Studies and earned her juris doctor from Stetson University College of Law in 2015. While in law school, Carolin was a law clerk at a general civil litigation firm, where she worked on cases involving breach of contract, landlord-tenant law, and family law. She was also a law clerk for the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Middle District of Florida. Carolin had an active role in her law school's campus activities where she served as a Student Ambassador, she was the president of the Immigration Law Student Association and the secretary of the Hispanic Bar Student Association.
Outside her law practice, Carolin enjoys exploring Central Florida.
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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
“All Suits” Means All Suits: Second DCA Requires Pre-Suit Notice for Non-Monetary Property Insurance Claims
October 5, 2026
The Second District Court of Appeals rendered an opinion finding that a cause of action must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to provide the statutorily required pre-suit notice (Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation), including actions concerning declaratory relief where no monetary damages are being claimed. Citizens petitioned for certiorari review of a trial court order denying its motion to dismiss the homeowner’s declaratory judgment action. Citizens argued dismissal was required because the homeowner failed to provide pre-suit notice through the Florida Department of Financial Services as mandated by section 627.70152, Florida Statutes. The pre-suit notice is a condition precedent which applies to residential or commercial property insurance policies per Section 627.70152. The trial court denied Citizen’s motion, concluding that pre-suit notice was not required because the homeowner was not seeking monetary damages and there was uncertainty concerning whether a coverage dispute existed. Citizens provided coverage for the homeowner’s property including hurricane loss. After alleged hurricane damage to the insured property, Citizens determined coverage for the loss fell below the policy deductible and denied the claim. The homeowner disagreed, their adjuster finding the loss exceeded the applicable deductible. The homeowner demanded appraisal under the policy. The respective party’s appraisers agreed on a loss amount, but the homeowner refused to sign the Appraisal Award form, objecting to its language as imposing extracontractual conditions. Rejecting the appraisal award, the homeowner filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judicial determination of the form's enforceability and their rights under the policy, without seeking monetary damages. On appeal, the homeowner raised issues concerning whether section 627.70152, Florida Statutes, requires pre-suit notice for declaratory judgment actions arising under residential property insurance policies when the plaintiff seeks no monetary damages. The Second District granted the petition and quashed the trial court's order. The Second District Court held that section 627.70152 requires pre-suit notice for all suits arising under residential property insurance policies, including declaratory judgment actions that do not seek monetary relief. The court was particularly stressed that the phrase 'all suits' means all suits without exception. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that general terms like 'all' must be given their general meaning (Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020), quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). "Consequently, we `strive to determine the text's objective meaning through "the application of [the] text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued" (Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021), quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 33). In making its decision, the Second District Court rejected the homeowners’ reliance on Bristol West Insurance v. MD Readers ,Inc., 52 So. 3d 48, 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), noting that case involved a different statute requiring pre-suit notice before filing 'any action for benefits,' not the broader language of section 627.70152. The court also rejected the homeowner’s argument that their suit did not 'arise under' the policy, finding that resolution required interpretation of policy terms, making it clearly arise under the insurance contract. The Second District Court granted Citizen’s Petition and the trial court order was quashed. The homeowners failed to provide the necessary notice and thus the case must be dismissed without prejudice.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Raise it or Waive it! In Order to Preserve Appeal, You Must Raise the Issues at the Trial Court Level
June 11, 2026
Homeowner's Choice Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Deborah Oakes No. 4D2024-1873, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D485a (Fla. 4th DCA March 18, 2026) The Fourth District Court of Appeals rendered an opinion finding that you must raise issues at the trial court level in order to preserve the issue for appeal, affirming the trial court’s final judgment. Through this opinion, the court provides an instructive examination of policy interpretation issues and further highlights the importance of preserving legal arguments at the trial level. Homeowners brought breach of contract action against property insurer Homeowners Choice in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, after the insurer denied coverage for damage to their house allegedly caused by an abrupt collapse. After trial of this breach of contract action, the court found, in reliance on holding by Fifth District Court of Appeals in Kings Ridge Community Ass'n v. Sagamore Insurance Co., that "additional collapse coverage" provided by policy could not be modified or qualified in any manner by other listed exclusions except those specifically contained within the "additional collapse" coverage provision. The magistrate issued a report and recommendation concluding that insured’s motion for partial summary judgment should be granted. The jury entered verdict in favor of insured and this appeal followed. On appeal, the insurer raised several issues concerning the interpretation of the insurance policy. However, the Fourth District Court found that the insurer's attorney failed to preserve these legal issues for appellate review during the trial proceedings. As noted within the opinion, one of the most common reasons behind a per curiam affirmance without written opinion is the appellant's failure to preserve issues for review. In this instance, the court was compelled to specifically address the preservation issue "to flesh out its requirements" as guidance for the bar. Namely, they examined the terms of the policy in detail specifically as to Section I, which contains four parts: (1) Property Coverages; (2) Perils Insured Against; (3) Exclusions; and (4) Conditions. The court paid special attention to the “Additional Coverages – Collapse” provision, as the policy expressly excludes collapse coverage except as provided in this section. The policy also includes endorsement that completely replaces the “Additional Coverages” section of the policy when a catastrophic ground cover collapse occurs. Ultimately, the court agreed with the homeowner that the only exclusions that apply relative to the additional coverage for collapse are the exclusions that are expressly stated within the additional coverage provision, while insurer failed to provide a substantive argument against insured’s interpretation of the policy or against the applicability of Kings Ridge. In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Fourth District Court noted that even after having the opportunity to address the policy interpretation issues at a hearing on the insurer’s exceptions to the magistrate’s report before trial, the insurer failed to properly raise arguments against the homeowner’s policy interpretation and instead focused on issues of fact as to whether the collapse was abrupt. The insurer largely failed to refute the homeowner’s actual argument for partial summary judgment concerning the inapplicability of general exceptions or exclusions based on the policy language. The insurer made a different argument than the arguments it made to advance on appeal. On appeal, the insurer argued that the text and structure of the policy and “well-reasoned case law” demonstrate that the general exclusions apply to all coverages, including additional coverage. Further, the insurer argued that the reasoning in Kings Ridge was distinguishable. It is noteworthy that the insurer did not present the trial court with these arguments and thus failed to preserve the arguments for appellate review. The lesson the Fourth District Court seeks to provide in taking the time to write this opinion is that particularly when an insurer believes the policy language supports its coverage position, it must properly raise those arguments during trial or the risk waiver on appeal. Core legal arguments must be raised with clarity and specificity, and the court rejects that notion that vague comments can substitute for clear and specific legal objections.
