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Carol A. VanderWoude

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CCVanderwoude@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Carol A. VanderWoude

Carol is a member of the Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group in the Professional Liability Department.  She focuses her practice on drafting concise, forceful briefs and delivering persuasive oral arguments in state and federal trial and appellate courts. Carol handles appeals across a wide range of subject areas which include, among others, products liability, toxic torts, medical malpractice, insurance coverage, civil rights, professional liability and premises liability.  As part of her practice, Carol regularly handles emergency matters which arise throughout the course of litigation and assists trial counsel with development of legal strategies, preparation of pre-trial motions, trial briefs, and post-trial motions. She also performs appellate monitoring of high-exposure trials to assist trial counsel in preserving issues for appeal. This assistance includes handling and arguing legal issues before the trial court so trial counsel can focus on witnesses and the presentation of evidence. 

In addition to her practice, Carol is actively involved in Pennsylvania defense organizations and informing members of the defense bar about notable legal developments. Currently, Carol serves as co-editor of Counterpoint, the well-regarded magazine of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. She has also hosted statewide teleconferences of defense counsel regarding new legal developments.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 2005, Carol worked for five years as a staff attorney for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit where she drafted memoranda of law and opinions on a variety of subjects including civil rights, employment, bankruptcy, immigration, securities and tax law. 

Carol graduated from California State University, San Marcos, magna cum laude, with a Bachelor of Arts in political science. She subsequently attended American University, Washington College of Law, where she obtained her juris doctor, cum laude, in 2001. While attending law school, Carol taught legal research and writing and served as a member of the American University Law Review.

    • Washington College of Law American University (J.D., cum laude, 2001)
    • California State University, San Marcos (B.A., magna cum laude, 1997)
    • Pennsylvania, 2005
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Loyola University, Philadelphia Alumni Chapter, Board of Directors
    • "Statute of Limitations Stands: Pennsylvania Court Affirms Dismissal of Breach of Contract Claim Against Insurance Broker,"PLUS Blog, March 4, 2025
    • "Equipment Manufacturers Liable for Replacement Parts Under Maritime Law, SCOTUS Says," Legal Updates for Toxic Torts Litigation, March 19, 2019
    • “En Banc PA Superior Court Vacates $14.5 Million Asbestos Verdict and Remands for New Trial,” Legal Updates for Toxic Torts Litigation, January 2015
    • "Addressing Malfunction Theory for First Time in 20 Years: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Clarifies Burden of Proof in Product Liability Case Based Upon Malfunction Theory," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010

    • Obtained reversal of a trial court's order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff's vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court disagreed. It was persuaded by the arguments raised on appeal and reversed. The court held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant's main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County, and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. The venue ruling was interlocutory and not appealable, but the Superior Court granted permission to immediately appeal the ruling so the venue issue could be resolved at the outset of the case.

      • Obtained dismissal of clients by Summary Judgment in a Philadelphia premises liability case in which we represented both the landowner and tenant. The plaintiff originally demanded $2 million, later reduced to $800,000. Although our clients were responsible for sidewalk maintenance, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirmed she tripped on a smaller portion of an alleged defect which was larger in other areas of the sidewalk. We successfully argued that this portion was de minimis and not actionable under Pennsylvania law. Despite a comprehensive opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agreed with our arguments, dismissing all claims against our clients with prejudice.

    Results

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    Superior Court Reverses Trial Court Venue Objections

    Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia) obtained reversal of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff’s vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court disagreed. It was persuaded by the arguments raised on appeal and reversed. The court held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant’s main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County, and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. The venue ruling was interlocutory and not appealable, but the Superior Court granted permission to immediately appeal the ruling so the venue issue could be resolved at the outset of the case.

    Summary Judgment Secured in a Case Involving a Trampoline Park Injury

    We obtained summary judgment in a lawsuit arising from an injury suffered at an indoor trampoline park. During the deposition, the plaintiff admitted that there are inherent risks of engaging in trampoline activities, including the risk of being injured. Under the no-duty rule, a defendant owes no duty of care to warn, protect, or insure against risks which are common, frequent, expected and inherent in an activity. In the motion for summary judgment, it was argued that a trampoline park has no duty to protect patrons from the inherent risks of injury when jumping from a trampoline. The court opined that the no-duty rule was implicated and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.

    Thought Leadership

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    Statute of Limitations Stands: Pennsylvania Court Affirms Dismissal of Breach of Contract Claim Against Insurance Broker

    March 4, 2025

    In a decision that is meaningful for both insurance brokers and the attorneys who defend them, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently affirmed the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ dismissal of breach of contract claims asserted against an insurance broker in Thuong Erin Wasielewski, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Thuong D. Nguyen, Deceased v. Goebel Insurance Agency, Inc. and Christopher Goebel, 2025 WL 66728.* The case arose from an underlying wrongful death lawsuit, and a related declaratory judgment lawsuit brought by the insurer against the policyholder.

    News

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    Firm Highlights

    Thought Leadership

    The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

    The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

    Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

    News

    Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

    Thought Leadership

    Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

    In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

    Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

    Result

    Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

    Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

    Result

    Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

    graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

    News

    Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

    Event

    CLM 2026 Focus Conference

    Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

    Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

    News

    Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

    Thought Leadership

    Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

    In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

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    Result

    Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case