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Carly is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of various professionals, public sector entities, and businesses, with respect to claims based on civil rights issues. 

Carly’s practice is particularly focused on public entity and civil rights litigation. In this role, she has achieved many favorable results. Carly has successfully defended public entities in a variety of matters from slip and falls to constitutional claims. For example, Carly obtained a win for her client in Magisterial District Court in Pennsylvania in a matter alleging civil rights violations by a Plaintiff who refused to leave government owned property.

In 2021, Carly received her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law with a concentration in civil and criminal litigation. During law school, Carly served as a research and teaching assistant, conducting extensive research in the fields of both civil and criminal law. Carly was also an active participant in the Veterans Clinic where she defended veterans in criminal matters at the Allegheny County Veterans Court. She also worked with incarcerated individuals at the Allegheny County Jail as a tutor.

Carly was previously a summer associate at Marshall Dennehey in 2020.  She obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in Corporate Communications and Intercultural Engagement from Duquesne University in 2018. 

Carly is currently admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2021)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Hills and Ridges Doctrine Update, Client Seminar, February 25, 2022
    • Obtained a dismissal of plaintiff’s legal and accounting malpractice claims in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff filed suit against a number of defendants as a result of tax liability stemming from a prior unrelated legal settlement. The plaintiff claimed that our attorney client was negligent in providing legal and accounting advice in regard to corrective tax filings following a legal settlement with a state entity. The plaintiff asserted claims of legal malpractice, accounting malpractice, fraud, and a host of constitutional violations. Carly sought dismissal via a number of arguments, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After multiple rounds of amended pleadings and briefing, the court entered an order adopting our jurisdictional argument and dismissed the plaintiff’s latest complaint without prejudice based upon a Rule 8 violation for his failure to plead a proper jurisdictional basis. While the dismissal order was without prejudice, the running of the statute of limitations results in our client obtaining the win. 

Results

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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

November 3, 2026

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Limiting Agent Liability in Pennsylvania: Knowledge, Reliance, and the E&O Landscape

May 7, 2026

Errors & Omissions (E&O) claims against real estate professionals in Pennsylvania frequently arise from allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation. However, Pennsylvania law provides meaningful guardrails for defense counsel, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to impose duties on agents that exceed statutory and common law obligations. A key principle, often dispositive at summary judgment, is that a seller’s agent does not owe an independent duty to investigate or discover latent defects. Under Pennsylvania law, a real estate agent representing a seller is not required to inspect the property for defects or to disclose conditions of which the agent has no knowledge. This principle aligns with the statutory framework governing licensee conduct, including the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), which imposes duties of honesty and good faith, but does not create an affirmative obligation to uncover unknown defects. As a result, liability exposure in E&O claims often turns on whether the agent had actual knowledge of the alleged defect and whether the buyer’s reliance was justifiable. The Gordon v. McManus decision illustrates these principles in practice and remains a useful tool for defense practitioners. No. 972 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10917627, at 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014). In Gordon, the plaintiffs asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement against real estate agents, alleging that the agents were aware of a recurring water infiltration issue and failed to disclose it. The plaintiffs further contended that the agents negligently misrepresented the condition of the property when questioned directly about potential water issues. The factual record, however, undermined these claims. The defendant agents maintained that they had no knowledge of any water infiltration problem. Critically, the plaintiffs had been informed by a neighbor that the basement had flooded on multiple occasions prior to closing. They also conducted their own inspection of the property and observed conditions – including the presence of a sump pump – that could reasonably signal potential water concerns. Despite these indicators, the plaintiffs did not pursue additional investigation or specialized inspection. The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the agents, emphasizing two key points that frequently arise in E&O defense. First, the absence of actual knowledge was fatal to the plaintiffs’ fraud claims. Without evidence that the agents knew of the defect, there could be no intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Second, and equally important, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance was not justifiable. Having been placed on notice of potential water issues, the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence in investigating the condition. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a buyer is aware of facts that would prompt further inquiry, reliance on generalized or informal assurances is insufficient to sustain a fraud claim. The Gordon court also disposed of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, reinforcing that such statutory claims cannot survive where the underlying fraud theory fails. For defense counsel, this linkage provides an additional pathway to narrow or eliminate exposure early in litigation. From an E&O perspective, Gordon highlights several recurring themes. Plaintiffs frequently attempt to recast nondisclosure claims as affirmative misrepresentation, particularly where there are informal communications between agents and buyers. Yet, absent proof of knowledge, these claims often collapse under scrutiny. Moreover, the decision underscores the importance of the buyer’s own conduct. Evidence that a buyer received notice of a potential defect, whether through third parties, inspection findings, or observable conditions, can significantly weaken claims of justifiable reliance. Practically, this framework offers clear guidance for both litigators and real estate professionals. For defense attorneys, early case assessment should focus on developing the evidentiary record regarding the agent’s knowledge and the buyer’s pre-closing awareness. For agents and brokers, risk mitigation remains centered on disciplined communication practices and encouraging independent inspections without offering definitive assurances about property conditions. Ultimately, while E&O claims in Pennsylvania continue to test the boundaries of agent liability, decisions like Gordon reaffirm a consistent judicial approach: liability cannot be imposed where knowledge is absent and reliance is unreasonable. In an environment where plaintiffs increasingly rely on hindsight to construct claims, these principles remain a critical line of defense.

Firm Highlights

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Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

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U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.