.

Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Portrait of Benjamin M.H. Goshko

Benjamin provides legal counsel across a wide range of industries including construction, trucking/transportation, product liability, and hospitality. He has successfully defended claims on behalf of construction contractors, product manufacturers, property owners, restaurants, and hotels in litigation involving fire losses, negligence, auto accidents, catastrophic injuries, and wrongful death. Regardless of complexity, Benjamin handles cases through every stage of litigation in state and federal court, from the taking and defending of depositions to trying matters to verdict. He understands the interests of his clients in the practical, prompt, and efficient resolution of claims. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Benjamin was an experienced litigator for an defense firm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, where he represented a broad range of clients in insurance defense and subrogation litigation. He served for many years as an arbiter with the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, as a pro bono PFA volunteer for the Bucks County Court, and as a member of the Inn of Court. 
 
Benjamin graduated from Temple University Beasley School of Law where he served as senior articles editor for the International and Comparative Law Journal. He is licensed to practice law in state and federal courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and before the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Outside of the office, Benjamin is an avid cyclist and history buff.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Temple University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2005)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012
    • U.S. Supreme Court, 2014
    • New Jersey, 2018
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2021
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2021
    • Insurance Society of Philadelphia
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Montgomery County Inn of Court
    • Obtained summary judgment for his client in this Bucks County matter which alleged that his client and a neighboring property owner were responsible for water and septic intrusions onto Plaintiff’s property. The three properties formed a large triangle between two roads in Perkasie, Pennsylvania and Plaintiff’s complaints against his neighbors went back over seven years. Ben argued the trespass onto Plaintiff’s property was permanent in nature and barred under the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff’s expert's failure to establish the intrusion emanated from his client’s property. 
    • Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in a Pennsylvania Breach of Contract Matter

We won summary judgment before the Honorable Anthony Verwey in Chester County, PA. The plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PAUTPCPL) against the defendants over the installation of an allegedly defective storm water remediation system. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff could not prove damages without an expert. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim could not proceed without expert support and the PAUTPCPL claims failed for lack of demonstrated damages.

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Case Involving a Fungal Infection Allegedly Contracted at a Hotel

We secured summary judgment in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff filed suit claiming he contracted a fungal infection from staying at the defendant’s hotel. The plaintiff produced an expert microbiologist’s report, in addition to his treating physician’s records, in support of his claims. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that the plaintiff’s expert was not competent enough to identify a specific fungus from photographs of the hotel room and the treating physician’s records were equivocal as to the cause of the plaintiff’s infection. Judge Arthur Zulick found the plaintiff’s microbiologist’s opinion speculative, as the microbiologist did not conduct an inspection of the hotel, obtain fungal samples or perform any lab testing. The judge further held that the plaintiff’s diagnoses of a fungal infection was not sufficiently supported by his treating doctor’s diagnoses. As a result, Judge Zulick entered judgment in favor of the defendant.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Refines Co-Employee Immunity

April 1, 2026

In this matter, the plaintiff was seriously injured while operating a skid steer. The skid steer was owned by the defendant personally, but was loaned to the defendant’s separate business entity, which the plaintiff worked for. The plaintiff filed an uncontested worker’s compensation claim against the business, but then brought suit against defendant-owner for claims related to a lack of maintenance of the skid steer. The defendant-owner sought summary judgement, arguing he was the plaintiff’s ‘co-employee’ and immune from suit pursuant to 77 P.S. § 72. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that for 77 P.S. § 72 to apply, the injury must be caused by negligence that occurred within the co-employee’s course and scope of his employment; indicating while not expressly stated, it is implicit to the statute. In the instant case, the defendant’s personal maintenance of the skid steer occurred outside of the course and scope of the defendant’s operation of his business. Thus, claims related to the maintenance of the skid steer would be separate from those concerning the operation of business, and therefore, not subject to immunity under 77 P.S. § 72.   This holding narrows co-employee immunity for negligence under the Worker’s Compensation Act to only those injuries caused by a co-employee while in the course/scope of their employment. This strengthens opportunities for employee-plaintiffs to file suits against owners who operate multiple entities.

Case Law Alerts

Appearance of Impropriety by Arbitrator Insufficient to Vacate Arbitrator’s Award

October 1, 2025

This York County matter concerned the plaintiff’s claim that Weis Markets was liable for her slip-and-fall and her injuries resulting therefrom. The plaintiff and the defendant agreed to remove the case to binding arbitration after discovery. The written agreement for the arbitration provided for a “hi/low” of $75,000/$750,000 and specified that no ex parte communications with the arbiter would be permitted.  During a lunchbreak at the arbitration, the arbiter privately met with counsel for the defendant and a Weis representative, contrary to the agreement. The arbiter then found in the defendant’s favor. Given the appearance of impropriety by the arbiter in engaging in ex parte communications, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, which was appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court noted that the arbiter’s ex parte meeting, indeed, gave the appearance of impropriety and could cast doubt on the impartiality of the arbitrator. However, the court held that this, by itself, was insufficient to vacate the award under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Instead, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff needed to present specific evidence of fraud, misconduct or corruption by the arbiter (i.e., that something improper occurred during the ex parte meeting). The Superior Court further held that vacating the award was not warranted as the the $75,000 “low” received by the plaintiff was not inequitable given disputed liability or unconscionable since the plaintiff still received some compensation. The impact of this decision is that the party attempting to vacate a binding arbitration award on the lack of neutrality by the arbitrator faces a very high burden of alleging specific conduct that would constitute fraud. In cases like Shannon, where the fraud is claimed to have occurred “behind closed doors,” this would seem to be a near impossible burden to meet.     Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.