Ashley is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on representing and defending insurance companies in insurance coverage disputes and first-party property litigation.
Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Ashley worked at an insurance defense firm where she handled personal injury protection and first party cases. She also has experience working at a consumer protection law firm providing representation to consumers against automobile manufacturers in the states of New York and Florida.
Ashley graduated from the University of Central Florida in 2010 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Legal Studies. She received her juris doctorate from Howard University School of Law.
Outside of the office, Ashley enjoys attending Miami Heat and Miami Dolphins games, traveling and spending time with her nieces and nephews.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith
Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages
June 24, 2026
In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages. The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a). Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Florida Court Rejects Retroactive Application of Pre‑Suit Notice Requirement in Property Insurance Dispute
June 11, 2026
Priest v. State Farm, No. 1D2024-1577 (1ST DCA) Mary Priest entered into a homeowners insurance policy with State Farm Florida Insurance Company with a renewal policy period that began on January 6, 2021. Ms. Priest filed a claim with State Farm as she allegedly sustained wind and water damage to her property. When a dispute arose among the parties regarding coverage and the amount of the loss, the appellant filed suit for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The appellant did not file a pre-suit notice of intent to initiate litigation prior to filing suit, as her insurance policy existed before the statutory pre-notice requirement went into effect on July 1, 2021. The main issue in this case was whether the statutory pre-notice requirement applied retroactively. Under Section 627.70152 of the Florida Statute, “[a]s a condition precedent to filing a suit under a property insurance policy, a claimant must provide the department with written notice of intent to initiate litigation on a form provided by the department.” This notice is required to be given at least ten business days before suit can be brought. Subsection (1) of this statute states that it “applies exclusively to all suits arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy.” Emphasis added. The courts have been split on the interpretation of this language. Specifically the 3rd DCA and 4th DCA believe the wording “all suits” demonstrated a clear intent for the statute to be applied retroactively; thus, encompassing insurance contracts that were already in existence at the time the statute went into effect. However, the 6th DCA did not agree with these opinions as it ruled “all suits” was not sufficient to conclude there was legislative intent for retroactivity. The 6th DCA ruling is currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court. Here, the court addresses the issue of retroactivity of the statutory provision by applying the two-pronged test in Mendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., Inc., 35 So. 3d 873, 876 (Fla. 2010). The first prong requires the court to determine whether the legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. The second prong requires the court to evaluate if the retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles if such intent is clearly expressed. When isolating the specific wording “all suits,” it could appear that it references all suits regardless of when the insurance policy was entered into. However, in context, it could mean the category of suit governed by the provision, namely residential and commercial policies. The appellee argued based on the legislative history of the statute, where the legislature removed the draft language “issued or renewed on or after July 1, 2021.” The court observed that the absence of statements in amendments does not constitute clear evidence of retroactive intent as bills are revised for many reasons during the legislative process. Thus, the court did not get past the first prong as they ruled there was no clear evidence expressing any legislative intent of retroactive application.
