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Ariel C. Brownstein

Portrait of Ariel C. Brownstein

Ariel, a shareholder in the Casualty Department, focuses his practice on insurance fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) litigation with particular emphasis on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud. His practice in the area of fraud investigation consists of assessing and analyzing fraud by both medical providers and falsified claims brought by his client's insureds. In doing so, Ariel has represented a significant number of insurance carriers on these issues and has assisted in multi-million dollar high-profile medical provider fraud investigations and law suits in various states.

Moreover, Ariel has litigated on behalf of many different clients in favor of protecting the interests of insurance carriers in court seeking to disclaim coverage for fraudulent claims. He has taken numerous comprehensive Examinations Under Oath on SIU-related issues throughout New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In particular, he has assisted in several high-value and high-profile matters regarding carrier recovery of monies paid to fraudulent medical providers and fraudulent motor vehicle accidents. Furthermore, Ariel has litigated extensive insurance fraud and other personal injury protection related matters in the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)/Forthright and Superior Court for his clients.

During his career, Ariel has handled several high value cases on behalf of his clients. In one particular case, the amount sought by the Claimant was denied by the arbitrator due material misrepresentations made by the insured regarding his prior medical history and his injuries at the time of the subject loss during an Examination Under Oath, conducted by Ariel.  In another matter, Ariel successfully argued that a claimant was subject to a personal injury protection benefit limit selected by the named insured, a live-in boyfriend and the amount demanded, was denied.

Prior to joining the firm, Ariel served as a law clerk for the Honorable Richard Geiger in Cumberland County Superior Court. His responsibilities included researching criminal law precedence, reviewing memoranda and pre-trial motions, and mediating civil lawsuits.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2008)
    • University of Delaware (B.S., 2005)
    • New Jersey, 2008
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2013-2023)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • International Association of Special Investigative Units
    • New Jersey Special Investigations Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Modern Staged Accidents & Provider Fraud, NICB Mid-Atlantic Region Training Event 2026, February 4, 2026  
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of First-Party Claims, NJSIA General Membership Meeting, December 9th, 2022
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of  First-Party Claims, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2022 
    • Medical Investigator's Guide to the Modern SIU Claim, Speaker, New Jersey Special Investigators Association (NJSIA) Annual Conference, Atlantic City, NJ, October 2019
    • NJ PIP: Building Better Medical Reviews, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2018
    • Current Fraud Trends PIP - NJ, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2016
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, January 2018-present
    • “Put a Pin in It: Getting a Grip on Medical Provider Fraud Costs and Acupuncture Claims**,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • "PUT A PIN IN IT - Getting a Grip on Medical Provider Fraud Costs and Acupuncture Claims," Claims Management, December 2014
    • “When a Vehicle Is an Automobile – The Maze of Statutory and Case Law in New Jersey for Determining Eligibility for PIP Benefits,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2014
    • "Winning Legal Strategies for Combating A Prickly Problem "Sticking" New Jersey PIP Carriers," co-author, Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013

Thought Leadership

Legal Update for Fraud/Special Investigation

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

July 21, 2026

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.

Case Law Alerts

Minnesota Court of Appeals Upholds Insurance‑Fraud Conviction, Validating Industry Fraud‑Impact Testimony

July 20, 2026

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Mark Jenni's insurance fraud conviction, which arose after he certified a Park Rapids property as his primary residence on a Liberty Mutual homeowner's policy and then filed an $80,000-plus burglary claim he never reported to the sheriff—on a property where he had previously submitted denied claims through a different carrier. On appeal, Jenni argued prosecutorial misconduct, contending the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that roughly 10% of claims are non-meritorious and that fraud costs run into the "billions" ultimately borne by consumers. He also claimed that closing arguments improperly appealed to Hubbard County jurors' financial self-interest. The court rejected both arguments, holding the investigator's testimony was relevant to establish his background and context, finding that the prosecutor's "cost to consumers" framing explained why application misrepresentations are criminalized rather than urging conviction on community-interest grounds. For the industry, the decision is favorable to SIU and fraud-prosecution efforts: it endorses carrier fraud-investigator testimony about industry-wide fraud prevalence and cost as admissible context, and it gives prosecutors latitude to argue the downstream consumer-cost rationale without crossing into impermissible community-conscience appeals. The practical takeaway for carriers and SIU referrals is that the "fraud drives up everyone's premiums" narrative—long a staple of fraud-bureau messaging—has now been validated as proper evidentiary and argumentative framing, at least in Minnesota.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.