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Angeline C. Panepresso

Portrait of Angeline C. Panepresso

Angeline is a member of the firm's Casualty Department and handles cases in both state and federal court. She devotes her practice to a variety of litigation matters including premises liability, product liability, automobile liability and construction liability. She joined Marshall Dennehey as a summer law clerk in 2008 and progressed to work within the firm's Aviation Litigation Practice Group, where she represented aircraft operators and owners, maintenance facilities, and component manufacturers in complex litigation matters.  

Angeline has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star in the field of Civil Litigation Defense since 2013.

An honors graduate of Lehigh University, she received her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law, graduating cum laude in 2009.  Prior to entering law school, Angeline spent a summer interning at the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office in the Family Violence/ Sexual Assault Unit.  During law school, she interned for the Honorable Thomas J. Reuter, United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Angeline is admitted to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and in the state of New Jersey.  She is also a certified arbitrator in Philadelphia.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2009)
    • Lehigh University (B.A., 2006)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2022-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Construction Law (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2013-2019)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • “Pennsylvania Pleading Requirements Clarified for Negligent Hiring and Related Claims: Rideshare Companies Have No Generalized Duty to Investigate Drivers,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024
    • “Narrowing the Scope of Medical Expert Qualifications and Testimony under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • "Catch and Release: A Plaintiff May Expressly Preserve Actionable Claims Against Insurance Agent While Releasing Insurer of Vicarious Liability," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2010
    • Successfully moved for summary judgment in numerous personal injury actions, resulting in determinations of non-liability.
    • Obtained favorable rulings on motions for partial summary judgment, resulting in the dismissal of a variety of claims.
    • Successfully moved for dismissal of a premises liability case brought against the owner of a home abutting a common driveway, totally eliminating liability on behalf of the client.
    • Successfully moved to open and strike a default judgment entered against a roofing company and its owner in a personal injury action.
    • Obtained a voluntarily dismissal of all claims against a client after filing a motion for summary judgment.
    • Obtained defense verdict in favor of client, homeowner, at arbitration where plaintiff alleged personal injuries from falling on the sidewalk outside the client's home.
    • Obtained dismissal of all claims against clients, beverage company and driver, where three (3) plaintiffs had alleged personal injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving the beverage company's tractor-trailer, after first obtaining the order to preclude plaintiffs from presenting  evidence against the beverage company and its driver at trial.
    • Obtained dismissal of all claims against client, beverage company, where a plaintiff hotel owner alleged the client's vending machine caused a fire and resulting property damage at its hotel.
    • Obtained dismissal of third-party complaint and cross-claim against client, equipment manufacturer, where plaintiff's decedent suffered fatal injuries while using equipment on the third-party plaintiff's premises.
    • Obtained dismissal of punitive damages claims against clients in actions involving DUI motor vehicle accidents.
    • Sat second chair for jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of client, airline, whose commercial airplane sustained significant damage when struck by improperly secured equipment at an airport.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Pleading Requirements Clarified for Negligent Hiring and Related Claims: Rideshare Companies Have No Generalized Duty to Investigate Drivers

December 1, 2024

Key Points: To successfully plead a claim for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision, a plaintiff must plead specific facts establishing: (1) specific instances of prior misconduct on behalf of an employee; and (2) the employer had knowledge of such specific instances of prior misconduct and still chose to hire, failed to terminate, or declined to supervise the driver, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger. To successfully plead a claim for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must plead specific facts establishing that a vehicle owner allowed the driver to operate a vehicle with specific knowledge that the driver intended to, or was likely to, use the vehicle in such a way that would harm another. Rideshare companies have no generalized duty to investigate their drivers. If a rideshare company fails to investigate its driver, the inference is that it has no knowledge of its driver’s qualifications, or lack thereof, for purposes of negligent hiring and related claims. In Henry v. Marcelin, 2024 WL 4293055 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2024), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, Lyft, a rideshare company, in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle collision. In doing so, the court clarified the elements necessary to prove the similar, but distinguishable, claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and negligent entrustment. The court further held that rideshare companies have no generalized duty to investigate their drivers. The plaintiff in Henry asserted a negligence claim against the defendant driver, as well as claims of vicarious liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, and entrustment against Lyft. Lyft filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing the plaintiff’s negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, and entrustment claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under F.R.C.P. 12(c). The court granted Lyft’s motion, holding the plaintiff failed to allege specific facts establishing any prior misconduct or dangerous propensity on behalf of the defendant driver, let alone that Lyft had knowledge of such misconduct or propensity to support such a claim under Pennsylvania law.  In reaching its holding, the court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring, training, retention, or supervision separately from the claim of negligent entrustment and came to the same conclusion. The court noted that, for the former claim to proceed under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege specific facts establishing that (1) the employee demonstrated a propensity for misconduct or ill fitness for the position and that, (2) nevertheless, the employer chose to hire, failed to train, declined to terminate, or failed to adequately supervise the employee, thereby putting the plaintiff in danger. The court further noted, although the theories of liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision are similar, they all have different elements a plaintiff must plausibly allege to proceed; specifically: To prove negligent hiring, the plaintiff must show that Lyft knew or was on notice of its driver’s propensity for misconduct, but nevertheless hired him, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger.  A negligent retention claim is similar, but requires the plaintiff to show that Lyft negligently declined to terminate its driver after learning of a dangerous propensity.  To prove negligent supervision, the plaintiff must show that Lyft knew or should have known of a need to supervise its driver, but failed to do so, thereby exposing the plaintiff to danger. Although all of these theories share the requirement that the plaintiff must allege the driver’s prior bad acts would put a reasonable employer on notice of his propensity to injure others, the plaintiff could not meet her burden merely by alleging the driver was “dangerous” or had a propensity for misconduct. Rather, the plaintiff had to allege specific examples of prior dangerous behavior and of Lyft’s knowledge of such behavior. The plaintiff’s complaint, however, included only broad allegations that Lyft hired and retained the defendant driver when it knew or should have known by and through his “prior unsafe conduct, and/or substandard driving conduct” that he was “incompetent and/or unfit to drive a motor vehicle.” The complaint alleged no specific instances of prior misconduct or of Lyft’s knowledge of such misconduct when it chose to hire, declined to terminate, and/or failed to adequately supervise its driver. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s negligent hiring and related claims. Similarly, the court held dismissal was also warranted on the plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim against Lyft, which required her to plead specific facts establishing that Lyft (1) permitted the defendant driver (2) to operate its automobile (3) with knowledge that the driver intended to or was likely to use the automobile in such a way that would harm another. The court again found the plaintiff’s complaint included only conclusory allegations that Lyft knew of the defendant driver’s “prior unsafe conduct” without alleging any specific facts to support such allegations and, thus, could not establish a plausible claim for relief.  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the court held that the plaintiff’s generalized allegations concerning Lyft’s lack of investigation into its driver’s record did not permit a reasonable inference that Lyft knew its driver was unqualified. Rather, such allegations permitted an inference that Lyft did not know anything about its driver’s qualifications because Lyft did not investigate him.  The court then explicitly rejected the existence of any generalized duty on behalf of a rideshare company to investigate its drivers, reasoning that “under Pennsylvania law, lessors—who are arguably similarly situated to Lyft—do not have a duty to investigate a lessee’s driving records unless they affirmatively assume responsibility from their lessee.” Thus, the court held, because the complaint lacked any factual allegations that Lyft affirmatively assumed responsibility for its driver or had specific knowledge of prior misconduct, Lyft was entitled to dismissal without prejudice of the plaintiff’s negligent hiring and related claims and any claim for negligent entrustment. The District Court’s ruling in Henry provides employers with greater clarity on the elements of the similar, but distinguishable, claims of negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision, and of negligent entrustment. The decision provides a strong argument for a motion to dismiss any such claims—including during the pleadings phase—based on a lack of specific facts or evidence establishing prior misconduct and the defendant employer’s knowledge thereof. The decision also provides defendant employers—and, particularly, rideshare companies—with an argument that it has no generalized duty to investigate its drivers. *Angeline is a member of our Casualty Department. She is a special counsel and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.