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Alexander C. Landolfi

Portrait of Alexander C.  Landolfi

As a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department, Alex represents employers, insurance carries and third-party administrators in defense of workers’ compensation and employment discrimination claims before the Industrial Accident Board and Delaware courts.

Alex earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Law and Justice from Rowan University. While pursuing his undergraduate degree, Alex worked for American Family Care Urgent Care where he gained valuable experience handling workers’ compensation coverage and claim issues.

While attending Widener University Delaware Law School, Alex was a staff editor to the Delaware Corporate Journal. After receiving his juris doctor, Alex served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Carl C. Danberg, Chief Judge of the Delaware Court of Common Pleas.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • Rowan University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Delaware, 2024

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN DELAWARE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2025

December 1, 2025

1.    Industrial Accident Board grants continuance but suspends temporary total disability benefits pending rescheduled hearing Fortt v. Delaware Brick Company, IAB No. 1542958 (Dec. 12, 2024) The claimant was injured in a work accident on January 16, 2024. On June 7, 2024, the employer filed a Petition for Review (PFR) to terminate the claimant’s ongoing total disability (TTD) benefits, which the Second Injury Fund began paying under 19 Del. C. § 2347(k).  At the claimant’s request, the October 21, 2024, hearing was continued to December 16, 2024, due to scheduling issues with his medical expert. In November 2024, the claimant’s medical expert’s cancelled a December 12, 2024, deposition for personal reasons. The employer’s medical expert was deposed as scheduled on December 4, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the claimant sought a second continuance, arguing his expert’s testimony was essential and the cancellation beyond his control.  The employer opposed, citing prejudice from delay, ongoing TTD payments, and risk of “stale” testimony. While the Second Injury Fund was currently paying those benefits, the employer was concerned they may have to repay those benefits once the petition was resolved. The Fund supported these arguments.  Although the Industrial Accident Board granted the claimant’s request for a continuance, it also suspended TTD benefits and froze the evidentiary record. The Board relied on Section 2348 (c) and (h) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which states that petitions must be heard within 120 days of the Pre-Trial Conference notice, with extensions granted only for “good cause” and/or “extraordinary circumstances.” Accordingly, a doctor’s voluntary unavailability raises the question as to whether it qualifies as an unforeseen circumstance. Ultimately, the Board found that, although the doctor’s choice was not out of his control, the claimant had no influence over the matter, making the continuance appropriate. In response to the employer’s concerns about prejudice, the Board deemed it reasonable to freeze the evidentiary record in consideration of case management procedures and to ensure the integrity of the employer’s testimony as if the hearing occurred on the original date. The Board determined that remedial action was necessary to minimize harm to both the employer and the Fund. Consequently, the Board ordered that claimant’s receipt of TTD benefits be suspended from the date of the rescheduled hearing on December 16, 2024, until the new hearing date, which was approximately 60 days later.   2.    Industrial Accident Board finds that claimant acted in self-defense; did not forfeit right to workers’ compensation benefits based on standards established by 19 Del. C. § 2353(b) Liriano v. Delaware Transit Company (DART), IAB No. 1550708 (Feb. 24, 2025) While working as a bus driver for the employer, an altercation transpired between the claimant and a drunk bystander, which was captured on video footage with limited audio. The footage showed the bystander leaning against a pole next to the claimant and asking for information. Unsatisfied with the claimant’s response, the bystander separated himself for a brief period and followed a second bus driver, Wayne Gardner. During this exchange, the bystander touched Mr. Gardner on the arm, prompting Mr. Gardner to swat the bystander’s hand away before continuing on his way.  The bystander then reapproached the claimant, at which point the claimant is seen backing away from him with his hands in the air. The bystander is then seen standing chest to chest with the claimant, which led the claimant to push the individual away three times, resulting in a physical altercation. Another bus driver intervened to break up the altercation. The claimant reported the incident to the dispatch, stating that it would likely be held against him. The bystander later approached the bus to apologize, and he admitted that he was intoxicated.  The employer argued that the claimant forfeited his workers’ compensation benefits under Section 2353(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act because he was the aggressor in the altercation. The employer claimed that the claimant acted with deliberate and reckless indifference to the danger inherent in such a physical altercation. The employer cited the video footage, directives that instruct drivers to walk away/retreat from conflict and the claimant’s acknowledgement that he might be held responsible for the event.  The claimant contended that he acted in self-defense. He relied on the video evidence, asserting that he would not have been able to safely retreat.  The Industrial Accident Board determined that the claimant had indeed acted in self defense. The Board mentioned that their review of the video contradicted the employer’s narrative and supported the claimant’s testimony that he tried to avoid confrontation. They noted that self-defense was justified because the unknown male continued to pursue the claimant and ultimately stood “chest to chest” with him. The Board further noted that the employer had not disciplined the claimant for misconduct or violations of the workplace violence policy following the incident, which was interpreted as an indication that they also recognized the claimant had acted in self-defense. As such, the employer’s petition was denied.    3.    Superior Court reverses Industrial Accident Board, holding sole proprietor properly elected workers’ compensation coverage  Bayly v. Red House Motors, 2025 WL 1305851 (Del. Super. May 6, 2025) The claimant, the owner of Red House Motors, the employer, was assaulted by an employee on June 16, 2021, resulting in serious injuries. At the time of the assault, a workers’ compensation policy covered workplace injuries for the employer’s employees. The claimant had asked to be covered by the policy, but the policy and annual audits conducted by the insurance carrier did not inform the claimant that he was uninsured for his own workplace injuries. Despite this, when the claimant reported the assault, the insurer informed him that he was not covered under the policy, issued a partial refund for his premiums, and subsequently canceled his policy.  The claimant filed a petition for benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, which concluded that the claimant, as an experienced businessperson, was aware that he needed to elect workers’ compensation coverage for himself but had not done so. While not directly stated, the Board seemed to believe that the claimant needed to elect workers’ compensation coverage either in writing or on the insurer’s prescribed form.  The Superior Court identified two flaws in the Board’s reasoning. First, regarding the workers’ compensation policy, the court noted that the policy included a section entitled “Who Is Insured” and the Extension of Information Page, which specifically listed the claimant as a “Named Insured.” Second, concerning the claimant’s status as an experienced businessperson, the court found that the expertise in insurance matters rested with the insurer, not the claimant.  The court also found it concerning that the insurer had not informed the Board that, although a sole proprietor must affirmatively elect personal coverage under a workers’ compensation policy, this does not need to be done in writing or on a prescribed form. The court believed the Board had incorrectly assumed that the claimant needed to make his election in writing or using a prescribed form. According to the court’s interpretation of 19 Del. C. § 2306(b) and 19 Del. C. § 2308(b), the claimant was not required to request coverage in writing or on a specific form. Furthermore, neither party disputed that the claimant had requested to be covered. As a result, the court determined that, under these statutes and the insurer’s own procedures, the claimant properly elected coverage. The Superior Court reversed the Board’s decision and instructed the Board to find that the claimant was covered under the workers’ compensation policy.    4.    Superior Court dismisses negligence claims but allows intentional tort action to proceed in electrical explosion case  McGuckin v. PBF Energy, Inc., 2025 WL 2223109 (Del. Super. Aug. 5, 2025) On January 24, 2023, the claimant was instructed by his manager to manually reset a circuit breaker for a machine that controls the speed and torque of an electric motor by varying frequency and voltage of its power supply. While doing so, an electrical explosion occurred, resulting in injuries to the claimant. After receiving benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the claimant filed several claims against the employer, including negligence, recklessness, intentional tortious conduct, strict products liability and loss of consortium. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting the Industrial Accident Board has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims that involve work-related injuries.  Both parties referenced Segura v. M Cubed Tech., Inc., 2019 WL 1504048, to support their arguments. In Segura, an employee was injured when a transformer switchbox exploded. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, the employee filed suit against the employer, alleging negligence and/or intentional conduct. The employer moved for a dismissal, and the court dismissed the negligence claim but allowed the intentional conduct claim to proceed. The court explained that while the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine bars suits by employees against their employers for work-related injuries based on negligence, it does not preclude claims involving intentional conduct by the employer.  Here, the employer argued that the claimant had merely “repackaged” negligence allegations with labels of intentional conduct; however, the court disagreed and found that the claimant provided adequate facts to support his intentional tort claims. Therefore, the court dismissed the negligence claims against the employer but allowed the intentional tort claim to proceed.    5.    Delaware Supreme Court allows workers’ compensation insurer to pursue subrogation against employee’s UIM recovery, subject to Horizon Services v. Henry, 304 A.3d 552 (Del. 2023) (Henry II) ProAssurance Grp. d/b/a Eastern Alliance Ins. Co. v. Manz, 2025 WL 3124822 (Del. Nov. 7, 2025) After the claimant was involved in a work-related motor vehicle accident, she filed a workers’ compensation claim. Ultimately, the claimant received a total of $454,070.72 from the workers’ compensation carrier, which included payments for medical expenses, lost wages and a lump sum intended to waive future entitlements to workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement documents included a clause granting ProAssurance, the workers’ compensation carrier, a lien against any recovery the claimant might receive from any entity, including an insurance carrier, as a result of the work accident.  In addition to pursuing workers’ compensation benefits, the claimant sought compensation from the driver responsible for her injuries and pursed a claim against her employer’s Underinsured Motorist policy (UIM). The UIM policy contained a non-duplication provision, stating that it would not cover any element of loss for which a person is entitled to receive payment through workers’ compensation benefits. An arbitrator awarded the claimant $215,000 for her UIM claim, and ProAssurance then asserted a lien against the UIM award pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2326(e).  The claimant filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court, seeking an order that would exempt her UIM award from ProAssurance’s lien. She argued that the non-duplicative clause in the UIM policy entitled her to funds that were not already compensated by ProAssurance for her workers’ compensation claim. ProAssurance countered that it was entitled to the claimant’s subsequent UIM recovery. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the claimant.  The Delaware Supreme Court discussed workers’ compensation carriers’ right to subrogation under 21 Del. C. § 2326(e) for boardable damages and found that non-boardable damages, which include but are not limited to those covered by Personal Injury Protection (PIP) policies, are not subject to subrogation. The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the case with instructions to determine what amount of the claimant’s UIM award is “boardable” and subject to subrogation.   6.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: direct deposit 19 Del. C. § 2344.      Amendments to 19 Del. C. § 2344, which went into effect on June 30, 2025, reflect current practices and technology, including enabling workers’ compensation payments to be made by direct deposit.    7.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: penalties, including incarceration 19 Del. C. § 2386(b) Section § 2386 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is titled “Violations by Insurers or Self-Insurers; Penalties.” Amendments to 19 Del. C. §2386(b), which went into effect on June 30, 2025, provide for mandatory fines and/or imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Section 2386(b) now reads:  (b) Whoever in this State does any of the following shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both.  (1) Acts or assumes to act as an agent in any capacity whatsoever for any insurance corporation, mutual association or company or interinsurance exchange, which is not authorized to do business in this State, or if such authority to do business in this State has been suspended, so acts or assumes to act while such suspension is in force.  (2) Neglects or refuses to comply with any obligatory provisions of this section.  (3) Willfully makes any false or fraudulent statement of the business or condition of any such insurance carrier or false or fraudulent return, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both. 8.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: assessments for administrative expenses or insurance carriers 19 Del. C. § 2392(c) Amendments to 19 Del. C. § 2392(c), which went into effect on June 30, 2025, allow the Office of Workers’ Compensation to increase the reimbursement percentage for activities from 66.6% to 100%, ensuring that the inspection and safety functions of the Division of Industrial Affairs are fully funded, as they were previously only partially covered. Insurance carriers will be responsible to pay the assessments imposed by this section. The annual budget process sets caps or spending limits on these appropriated special funds each year.    9.    Amendment to increase reimbursement rates for workers’ compensation medical services 19 Del. C. § 2322B(c) This amendment permits a permanent one-time increase of 3% in aggregate workers’ compensation medical expenses to correct Evaluation and Management Code reimbursements, which have fallen below the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ rates. The amendment goes into effect on January 31, 2026.   10.    New workers’ compensation rates The Department of Labor announced that the new workers’ compensation rates effective July 1, 2025, establish an average weekly wage of $1,386.46. Accordingly, the maximum weekly compensation rate is $924.31, and the minimum weekly compensation rate is $308.11.  What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.