.

Aaron provides legal counsel to attorneys, accountants, real estate agents, home inspectors, home appraisers, insurance brokers, and other professionals. Aaron has strong experience representing insurance brokers throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, including complex claims involving issues concerning duty of care, policy interpretation, whether alternative policies were available, and claims with nuanced statute of limitations issues. He handles a variety of claims including, but not limited to, legal and accounting malpractice, wrongful use of civil process, commercial litigation, negligence, breach of contract, municipal liability, and civil rights matters.  Aaron is also experienced in consumer financial services litigation and compliance, particularly representing attorneys and agencies in debt collection practices.

Outside of his professional liability practice, Aaron is also an experienced litigator, defending clients in matters involving premises liability, land use, automobile liability, intellectual property and employment law.

Aaron is a 1987 graduate of Millersville University. Following graduation, he taught grades six through eight in the School District of Philadelphia for 12 years. During that time, he earned a Master's Degree in Education from Temple University. While teaching, Aaron attended evening classes at the Beasley School of Law at Temple University where he made the Dean's List and earned honors in Trial Advocacy and Research and Writing. Aaron began his legal career as an associate with a Blue Bell, Pennsylvania law firm, where he primarily focused on defending Pennsylvania municipalities in areas of civil rights law, premises liability, land use and automobile liability.

Aaron has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by the Martindale Hubbell.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2003)
    • Temple University (M.A., 1995)
      • El. Ed.
    • Millersville University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2016
    • Delaware, 2020
    • U.S. District Court District of Delaware, 2021
    • Top Lawyer, Legal Malpractice, Delaware Today (November 2026)
    • Top Lawyer, Legal Malpractice, Delaware Today (November 2024)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation
    • Proving a Case Within a Case in Legal Malpractice Actions, PLDF Annual Meeting, September 2018
    • Developments in Lawyer Liability in Pennsylvania & New Jersey, client seminar, March 2017 
    • Professional Liability - Issues for Attorneys, client seminar, June 2016
    • Virtual Law Office and Interstate Practice of Law, National Business Institute, April 2015
    • Aaron has been invited to speak to the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants as well as the Pennsylvania Home Inspector Association. Aaron has also given presentations to insurance companies concerning developments in legal malpractice law.
    • "LPL Claims Without Privity: Support for a Bright Line Rule", Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Fall 2018
    • "Proving The 'Case-Within-A-Case' Standard," For The Defense, April 2018
    • "Demonstrative Evidence at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author 
    • "Common Evidentiary Issues at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018
    • "Responsive Pleadings", Pennsylvania Civil Pre-Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author
    • Pennsylvania Legal Malpractice Handbook, 2017 Edition, 2019 Edition, Published by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Co-author 
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Challenge to the Dragonetti Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "An Argument Against Imposing Liability Against Attorneys for Aiding and Abetting Their Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Pennsylvania Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2011
    • "Former Phillies Tyler Green Thrown a Curve on Appeal for Legal Fees," Defense Digest, September 2007
    • "Medical Malpractice Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros Lacks Merit," Defense Digest, March 2007
    • Regular contributor to MDWC&G Case Law Alerts.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract. The claims were brought against our client, an out of state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The Court granted the attorney’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the for obtaining dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. The Court also held that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
    • Successfully defended a home inspector before the Delaware Division of Professional Regulation. The Claimants sought disciplinary action against our client in connection with his inspection of their home. We were able to persuade the Division that the complained of defects at the property were not subject to inspection because they were not visible at the time of inspection. The Division weighed all concerns involved in the matter and on November 1, 2023, it concluded that the facts did not reflect a violation of the laws, rules, and regulations that governed the activities of the licensed professional.
    • A unanimous jury found in favor of our clients, a lawyer and his law firm in a legal malpractice case arising out of the lawyer’s drafting of a postnuptial agreement. The postnuptial agreement was invalidated by a family court judge, causing the husband to lose approximately $1.2 million as part of a subsequent property separation agreement. The jury considered testimony from the plaintiff’s ex-wife which reflected that she had signed the agreement under duress and concluded that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the postnuptial agreement was invalidated as a result of anything the lawyer did.
    • Plaintiff claimed that estate attorneys misinterpreted stock restriction agreement causing Plaintiff's husband's estate to lose in excess of $1 million.  Court held that agreement was properly interpreted by attorneys
    • Attorney prosecuted civil rights claim on behalf of mother of son who was shot and killed by a Philadelphia police officer while unarmed and posing no threat to the officer.  Mother of decedent served as administrator of estate and retained proceeds of settlement.  Decedent allegedly had two children who should have received the proceeds.  Attorney sued by children's mother on their behalf. Plaintiff's minor children made $1 million settlement demand  just prior to the court's dismissal of the claims. 
    • Plaintiff claimed that his attorney failed to properly prosecute his workers' compensation claim causing his benefits to be discontinued.  Plaintiff's claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Buyers of real property sued real estate agent for seller, claiming misrepresentations regarding use of the property.  Claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed promptly by way of preliminary objections. In such cases, the Plaintiff failed to allege facts that, even if true, could yield liability as to our client.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed upon the filing of motions for non pros as a result of opposing counsel's failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
    • Summary judgment and motions to dismiss granted on behalf of a number of clients. In one recent case, the plaintiff claimed that our attorney client was liable to him for wrongful use of civil proceedings and was seeking in excess of $3 million in damages. Upon the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dismissed our client, finding no liability whatsoever.
    • Success in defending clients at arbitration hearings and bench trials, including cases involving alleged home inspector liability and insurance subrogation claims.

Results

One Month – 4 Outstanding Results! Aaron Moore Obtained Four Successful Results on Behalf of Clients in the Span of One Month

Defense verdict on behalf of a real estate broker and agent. The plaintiffs, homebuyers, claimed that the sellers’ broker and agent were liable to them for the value of fixtures that were taken by the sellers when they vacated the property, which were alleged to have been included in the sale. At a bench trial, the judge determined that neither the broker nor the agent could be held liable to the plaintiffs because the representations regarding what was included in the sale were made by the sellers. Supreme Court affirmance of dismissal of a complex legal malpractice lawsuit. Aaron and Carol Vanderwoude obtained a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees, our client’s legal fees, or expert witness fees, or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative. Motion to dismiss in complex matter involving claims of fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, and piercing the corporate veil. The plaintiff, an investment fund, had purchased a business that was controlled and primarily owned by our client. The business ultimately went bankrupt, and the plaintiff claimed that the purchase was premised upon misrepresentation by our client. The plaintiff maintained that jurisdiction in Delaware was proper pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The District Court was persuaded by arguments reflecting that it lacked personal jurisdiction over our client, a citizen of Canada, even though he signed the Asset Purchase Agreement which included language conferring jurisdiction over claims arising from the sale in Delaware. The court agreed that our client did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity, and the plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil allegations were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim. Obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees that were paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.

Unanimous Appellate Decision Preserves Defense Win in Legal Malpractice Suit

We successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by members of our Lawyers’ Professional Liability Department in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

July 29, 2026

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Case Law Alerts

Delaware Superior Court Addresses Continuous Representation Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Case—But Was It Really Applied?

January 1, 2026

In what the court stated was a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court applied the “continuous representation doctrine” in a legal malpractice case. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his attorneys did not take any meaningful action to prosecute his underlying lawsuit and failed to sufficiently communicate with him. The court dismissed the underlying action sua sponte for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff maintained he first learned that his underlying claims had been dismissed by the Superior Court 18 months after the dismissal. He then commenced his legal malpractice action more than three years after the dismissal. The defendant attorneys moved to dismiss the malpractice claims based on Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations, which, under the occurrence rule, began to accrue at the time of dismissal of the underlying action. The court held that the continuous representation doctrine was applicable because the “cause of action conceivably accrued at some point after the court dismissed the underlying suit” because the attorneys failed to take efforts to reopen the judgment. It appears that the Delaware Superior Court has conflated the “continuous representation doctrine” with the concept of continued negligence. There are some jurisdictions that recognize the continuous representation doctrine, which provides that a legal malpractice cause of action accrues at the end of the underlying representation, irrespective of when the negligence occurred during the representation. Delaware, however, follows the “occurrence rule,” which, in the absence of equitable tolling, provides that a cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged negligence. Here the court properly concluded that the cause of action could be deemed to have accrued after the dismissal of the underlying claims if the plaintiff could demonstrate continued negligence after the dismissal. The court’s use of the phrase “continuous representation doctrine,” however, could lead to confusion as to whether that doctrine is actually applicable in Delaware. The court entertained a motion for re-argument and issued a second opinion, where it made clear that the plaintiff’s claims were not time barred because of allegations of continued negligence. The second opinion did not reference the “continuous representation doctrine”; however, it did not specifically clarify that the doctrine was not applicable.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.