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Defense Digest

The Evolution of Political Subdivision Immunity in Ohio

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

Key Points: 

  • A.W. v. Board of Education of Twinsburg discusses political subdivision immunity in Ohio. 
  • Appellate court discussed application of political subdivision immunity to public school districts. 

In June 2024, in A.W. v. Board of Education of Twinsburg, 2024 WL 3220270 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. June 28, 2024), an Ohio appellate court issued a decision shedding light on political subdivision immunity in the state. More specifically, the court discussed its application to public school districts. 

The case stems from a physical altercation that took place between two minors, referred to as A.W. and M.G., on school property. Shortly after the fight began, school personnel intervened to break up the students. After the altercation, A.W. was sent home from school without receiving medical attention. Within 24 hours of the attack, A.W. sought treatment at an emergency room because she was suffering from severe headaches, nausea, and vomiting. She was ultimately diagnosed with a concussion.

On March 17, 2023, A.W. and her parents filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against M.G., his parents, and the Twinsburg City School District Board of Education. The complaint alleged causes of action against the Board for recklessly failing to exercise control of a student, negligently failing to exercise control of a student, recklessly failing to provide necessary medical attention, and negligently failing to provide necessary medical attention. 

After the complaint was filed, the Board filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, as a political subdivision, it was entitled to immunity pursuant to Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code. The plaintiff did not respond to the motion, but it was, nonetheless, denied by the trial court. In its denial, the trial court found that the complaint pled sufficient material allegations to show the Board was not entitled to political subdivision immunity. 

The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act is codified in R.C. 2744.01, and it establishes a three-tiered analysis for determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability. “Under the first tier of the analysis, political subdivisions enjoy a general grant of immunity for any injuries, deaths, or losses allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or [its] employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 196–197 (2006). The second tier requires an analysis as to whether an exception applies to a political subdivision’s comprehensive immunity. The exceptions are as follows: 

  1. injury, death, or loss caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by a political subdivision’s employee;
  2. injury, death, or loss caused by the negligent performance of acts with respect to proprietary functions;
  3. injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads;
  4. injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function; and
  5. injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code.

Under the third tier, immunity may be restored, and the political subdivision will not be liable if one of the defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03(A) applies. Moss v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 185 Ohio App.3d 395, 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 2014) .

As for the first tier, it was undisputed that the Board is a governmental agency/organization and, therefore, is granted broad governmental immunity. With regard to the second tier, however, the plaintiff argued that the Board was not entitled to immunity because it was engaged in a proprietary function—the second exception under R.C. 2744.01. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the Board engaged in two proprietary functions: Failing to control M.G., thereby allowing him to attack A.W., and failing to provide A.W. with medical attention following the attack. The trial court agreed, holding that the Board may be liable for injury to a person caused by negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to providing a public school education.

On appeal, the Ninth District disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion, holding that “neither the Board nor its employees were engaged in proprietary functions as required.” The appellate court further explained that R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(c) specifically designates “[t]he provision of a system of public education” as a governmental function. The Board’s exercise of control over the students and its provision of medical care for the students cannot be deemed proprietary functions under existing law. These functions must be strictly categorized as governmental functions. Therefore, the Board must be granted immunity under R.C. 2744.01. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.