The Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff may sustain a "cat's paw" claim under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 if a supervisor's antimilitary animus act is a proximate cause of the adverse employment action.

The plaintiff brought a "cat's paw" claim pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 wherein he sought to hold his former employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who did not make the ultimate decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his immediate and secondary supervisors were hostile to his military obligations and issued him a written warning for violating a company rule. Approximately three months later, the employer's vice president of human resources received a complaint from the plaintiff's co-worker regarding the plaintiff's unavailability and abruptness. Three weeks later, the vice president of human resources received a complaint from the plaintiff's secondary supervisor that the plaintiff left his desk without informing a supervisor in violation of previous discipline issued to him. Based upon the last complaint and a review of the plaintiff's personnel file, the employer's vice president of human resources made the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment. After the plaintiff's termination, he alleged that his termination was motivated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist and, while the vice president of human resources did not have hostility to his obligation, his immediate and secondary supervisors did and their actions influenced the ultimate employment decision. At trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages. On appeal, however, the Court determined that the plaintiff's "cat's paw" case could not succeed because the vice president of human resources looked beyond what the plaintiff's supervisors told her in making her decision and, therefore, the plaintiff failed to show that "the non-decision maker exercised such 'singular influence' over the decision maker that the decision to terminate was the product of 'blind reliance'." In reversing the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that "if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA." In so holding, the Court noted that the one who makes the ultimate employment decision does so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors and those assessments may have a "motivating factor in the employer's action," as set forth in the statute. As a result, the Court reasoned that "if the employer's investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action…, then the employer will not be liable. But the supervisor's biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor's recommendation, entirely justified."

Case Law Alert - 2nd Qtr 2011