The scope of employment: are injuries occurring at home during the maintenance of essential items used in work compensable?

The petitioner, the owner and driver of a tractor trailer, entered into a written lease agreement with the respondent to use his vehicle to perform hauling services exclusively for the respondent. As a provision of this lease, the petitioner agreed to maintain, register and insure his vehicle at his own expense in a good and safe condition, and in compliance with the regulations of all applicable public authorities. During the course of this lease, the petitioner routinely drove his vehicle to the respondent's yard on weekdays, where he would receive hauling instructions from one of the respondent's dispatchers. On weekends, the petitioner performed routine maintenance of his vehicle at his home. On Sunday, December 22, 2003, the petitioner injured his right eye while performing repairs to his vehicle. As a result, he lost all sight in his right eye. The petitioner filed a claim with the Division of Workers' Compensation. The respondent denied the petitioner's claim on the grounds that the petitioner was an independent contractor and not an employee of the respondent. Further, the respondent contended that, even if the petitioner were an employee of the respondent, his injury occurred outside the scope of his employment. The matter was bifurcated, and a trial was conducted as to the issue of compensability only. At the end of trial, the judge of compensation concluded that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent, not an independent contractor, as the respondent "had total control of the workday, told petitioner exactly what to do all day, and petitioner was precluded from working for anyone else during the time period that he worked for [respondent.]" Notwithstanding his finding of an employer/employee relationship, the judge of compensation found that the petitioner's injury occurred outside the scope of his employment. As the basis for his ruling, the judge of compensation cited the fact that the petitioner was not on duty at all times and was not obligated to perform his own maintenance on his vehicle. Further, as the petitioner was not precluded by the lease agreement from utilizing his vehicle for his own personal use, the maintenance of the vehicle provided benefit not only to the respondent, but to the petitioner as well. Accordingly, the judge of compensation dismissed the petitioner's claim. The petitioner appealed as to the issue of scope of employment. In reversing and remanding, the Appellate Division relied primarily on Kossack v. Bloomfield, 63 N.J. Super. 322 (Law Div. 1960). In Kossack, the court affirmed an award of compensation to a police offer who was injured while cleaning his gun at home. The Kossack Court noted that the police officer had a duty to keep his service revolver clean and serviceable at all times. Moreover, there was nothing in the police regulations that specified the time and place where the officer's weapon should be maintained. Utilizing the court's reasoning in Kossack, the Appellate Division in the instant case found that, like the police officer in Kossack, the petitioner in the present matter was required to maintain an essential item used in his work, a tractor trailer, in good condition, but his employer did not dictate a particular time or place for him to perform that maintenance obligation. As such, the Appellate Division concluded that the maintenance of the petitioner's vehicle could be done at any time and place reasonably convenient to the petitioner, including at his own home on weekends. The Appellate Division also commented that the judge of compensation's finding that the maintenance of the petitioner's vehicle was not only beneficial to the respondent, but also to the petitioner, was not dispositive of the issue of compensability. "The potential for dual benefit," the Appellate Division concluded, "does not eviscerate the fact that, at the time of his eye injury, the petitioner was engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned under his employment agreement."

Case Law Alert - 4th Qtr 2010