.

Michael A. Salvati

Portrait of Michael A. Salvati

A litigator and legal scholar, Michael provides streamlined solutions to his casualty clients’ most complex litigation challenges. With a focus on product liability, premises liability, automobile and other personal injury claims, he provides counsel to manufacturers of consumer goods, regional and national retail chains, manufacturing facilities, restaurants/bars, commercial landowners, pharmacies and more. Michael has experience in all aspects of defense litigation, from initial claim investigation through discovery and trial.  Michael has also assisted in the defense of class actions involving various subject matters, ranging from alleged product failures to data breach claims.

Michael prioritizes efficiency, achieving favorable outcomes, and ensuring the best possible results for his clients. By dissecting the key issues in litigation, he aims to avoid unnecessary complexities and legal disputes. He approaches every client matter strategically, by first assessing the case; identifying critical legal arguments; and creating a well-informed legal strategy.  

An avid reader and life-long student, he keeps abreast of legal topics pertinent to his clients, so he can better understand the current legal landscape and how it may impact their cases. A prolific writer, he has published substantive articles in The Pennsylvania Lawyer, The Legal Intelligencer and Law360. 

Michael’s scholarship and devotion to the law has not gone unnoticed. In 2023, he was selected to serve a five-year term on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Civil Jury Instruction Subcommittee, which drafts jury instructions used by trial judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Admitted to practice in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Michael is a member of the Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and New Jersey State Bar Associations. He is additionally a member of the Defense Research Institute where he has served as an editor for its Product Liability Defenses, a State-by-State Compendium. 

Prior to joining the firm, Michael served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Timothy G. Farrell of the Superior Court of New Jersey. In that capacity, Michael managed the judge's dockets, drafted opinions and orders, and served as a mediator in Small Claims and Special Civil Part cases.

Michael earned his juris doctor at Villanova Law School, where he graduated in the top 10% of his class, was a member of the Order of the Coif, and served as an Associate Editor of the Villanova Law Review.  He earned his bachelor's degree in history from Villanova University, where he graduated first in his class with a 4.0 GPA.

Michael resides in South Jersey with his wife and twin boys.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2025)
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court Subcommittee for Civil Jury Instructions
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
  • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability case pending the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The case involved an alleged trip-and-fall at a Chester County movie theater.  At the close of discovery, we filed a Rule 702 Motion challenging Plaintiffs’ expert and a Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Court granted both, finding that Plaintiffs’ expert did not satisfy the “reliability” or “fit” requirements of Rule 702; and finding that Plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants were on notice of an any allegedly hazardous condition.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client, a nonprofit organization, in a premises liability action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff allegedly fractured her leg after slipping and falling on an icy walkway outside the client’s community center. We argued that her claims were barred by a liability waiver she signed as part of her membership application. Although the plaintiff denied signing the waiver, the court ordered targeted discovery, and both parties retained handwriting experts. The court ultimately found that the defense had persuasively established the authenticity of the signature and that the plaintiff’s unsupported denials were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Summary judgment was entered in favor of our client.

    Successfully obtained dismissal of a wrongful death action against a product manufacturer and distributor for lack of personal jurisdiction. The case involved allegations of a defective windshield installed in Pennsylvania, but the defense team demonstrated that the clients—located in Ohio and South Carolina—lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state, overcoming the plaintiff’s stream-of-commerce jurisdiction theory.

    Prevailed on a Motion to Dismiss in a data breach class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Sixteen named plaintiffs brought claims alleging that a hacker had accessed the personal information of over 1,000,000 individuals nationwide. We defended the debt collection company whose computer servers were compromised. Plaintiffs asserted broad and novel legal theories, including negligent failure to protect data, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, negligence per se, and violations of various state consumer protection laws. We successfully contested these claims, resulting in the dismissal of eight plaintiffs for lack of standing and 15 of the 17 asserted causes of action being dismissed.

    Obtained a defense verdict as second chair in a federal jury trial involving an allegedly defective motorcycle that caught fire when left running contrary to instructions in the owner's manual, causing significant fire and smoke damage to the plaintiffs' residence.

    Obtained a summary judgment on behalf of a janitorial franchising company, successfully arguing that it was not responsible for the rogue acts of its franchisee who allegedly stole jewelry and engaged in sexual acts while cleaning the plaintiff's office.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners, successfully arguing that they had no duty to prevent their general contractor from injuring his subcontractor, the plaintiff, who had fallen from a ladder on the job.

    Successfully defended a retail pharmacy and its delivery driver at arbitration on an auto accident claim for which liability was uncontested.  Michael obtained a limited tort finding and limited plaintiff to recovery of her unpaid medical expenses, which were minimal.  The suit had initially been filed as a major jury case before being remanded to arbitration, and the award was less than 1% of plaintiff's original demand.

    Obtained a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of product liability and wrongful death claims brought against a truck dealership that was located in Ohio and that did not conduct regular business in Pennsylvania.

    Obtained a summary judgment for the manufacturer of a smoker in a failure to warn claim involving an allegedly defective barbecue smoker by successfully challenging the opinions of the plaintiff's expert as speculative.

    • The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers, A.M. Best Podcast, April 1, 2026
    • Strategies to Mitigate Risk and Avoid Litigation, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, May 14, 2025
    • Panel Member, Nuts and Bolts of Litigation Practice Under the Fair Share Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, April 2016.
    • Litigation Pointers for Defending the Supermarket Slip and Fall Case, Liberty Mutual Insurance, February 2015
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Must Defend Established Venue Standard," Law360, February 17, 2023
    • "A Two-Pronged Test Becomes One - Why the Superior Court's Venue Decision in Hangey Departs From Decades of Prior Precedent," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, January/February 2023
    • "After 'Tincher,' Evidence of Industry Standards Should be Admissible in PI Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, Personal Injury Supplement, November 5, 2021
    • “There’s No Turning Back Now: Product Liability Jury Instructions in the Wake of Tincher v. Omega Flex,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "There’s No Place Like “Home”: Challenging General Jurisdiction When an LLC Is a Citizen of the Forum State," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • “Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act: Practical Pointers for Litigators,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2014, co-author

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Summary Judgment on Failure-To-Warn Claim, Offers Helpful Illustration of “Deeding Presumption.”

November 3, 2026

This products liability case involved an allegedly defective walk-behind lawnmower that had been manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff had purchased the lawnmower as a floor model, which did not come with an owner’s manual. The lawnmower did feature a prominent on-product label, though, which warned users about mowing on sloped areas. The plaintiff failed to heed the warning, slipped while mowing a sloped portion of his backyard, and suffered a mangled left foot. Plaintiff advanced claims of failure-to-warn and design defect. The former claim was dismissed at summary judgment; the latter returned a defense verdict at trial.  On appeal, the Superior Court upheld the result, but spent most of its opinion discussing the warnings claim. In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff enjoys the benefit of a “heeding presumption” – a rebuttable presumption that, if an adequate warning has been provided, the plaintiff would have read and heeded it. (Some cases have held that the heeding presumption only applies in workplace asbestos cases.  McDonnell did not mention or apply that limitation.) The heeding presumption serves to help establish the “causation” element of a failure-to-warn claim, i.e. that a different warning would have prevented the incident. The heeding presumption is rebuttable, though, upon evidence to the contrary. In McDonnell, the defendants pointed to the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony that he did not feel the need to track down a copy of the owner’s manual, or even spend time reading the on-product label.  That was sufficient, the Superior Court held, to rebut the heeding presumption, and require Plaintiff to present affirmative evidence that a different warning would have made a difference.  Plaintiff did not do so, and the Court found there was no basis to conclude that Plaintiff would have treated an alternative warning any differently than the current warnings he had ignored. Because Plaintiff could not establish the causation element of his failure-to-warn claim, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment on that issue. Helpfully, the Court also re-affirmed the corollary heeding presumption in favor of product sellers: “Where the given warnings are sufficient to make a product safe for its intended use, a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of his failure to heed them, for manufacturers and sellers are also entitled to a presumption that consumers will heed it.” Ultimately, McDonnell is a good illustration of the shifting burdens that apply in a failure-to-warn claim. 

Defense Digest

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

June 30, 2026

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.